Boycotts, Coalitions and the Threat of Violence:

The Run-Up to the January 2005, Iraqi Elections

By Ibrahim al-Marashi

The January 31, 2005, Iraqi parliamentary election is one of the most important events in that country's modern history. This event has required a whole new political mechanism, the formation of political parties, and dealing with difficult security problems. The success or failure of the election will have a tremendous impact on U.S. policy and Arab politics. This article analyzes the organization of the election, the campaign, and the emerging political forces in Iraq.

The January 31, 2005 election in Iraq brought about the organization of political forces there for the post-Saddam era. While Iraqis generally looked forward to a transition from an interim administration to a nationally elected regime, there were many obstacles to successful elections including a lack of internal security and insufficient guarantees of the protection of the polls; the Arab Sunni boycott; shortcomings in voter education; and the limited party options available without sectarian or ethnic platforms.

Yet the stakes were high not only for Iraq on a regional and even global level. After the conclusion of the 2003 Iraq war, President George Bush declared that the United States would ensure Iraq serve as an example of a successful democracy in the heart of the Arab Middle East. Arab states and their peoples also watched the election not only to see the direction of Iraq itself but also as a potential model, or threat, to their own countries' structure.

In the months leading up to the election, the nation witnessed the mobilization of Iraq's Shi'a, Kurds and Sunnis, as well as a few other parties advocating non-sectarian and non-ethnic platforms. The interim government, dominated by Arab Shi'as and Kurds, tried to balance cooperation with the United States with demonstrating it can govern independently without American interference. The Arab Sunnis for the most part failed to engage in the post-Saddam administration after losing control of a state they had dominated for decades. While the Shi'a and Kurds wanted to take part in the elections--knowing they would more likely emerge with power and then use it to end the U.S. occupation--Sunnis declared a boycott.

Elections are not an entirely new concept in Iraq. The Hashemite monarchy, which ruled Iraq from 1921 until 1958, adopted a parliamentary system based on that of its colonial rulers, the British.[1] Opposition political parties existed and political debates were tolerated in the parliament. Prior to the monarchy's overthrow, there was a relatively free press with close to 23 independent newspapers in Iraq's major cities.[2] However, the monarchy was perceived as too pliant to British "imperialist demands" and what emerged afterwards was a series of "revolving-door dictatorships" which Iraq experienced in the 1950s and 1960s.[3]

When Saddam Hussein came to power as vice-president through a military coup in 1968, he worked behind the scenes to eliminate all political opposition to his Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. After assuming presidential power in 1979, he held elections but only with himself as the sole candidate.

OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQI ELECTION PROCESS

On June 8, 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1546 gave a unanimous endorsement to transferring sovereignty to the new Iraqi government and endorsing the January election for a Transitional National Assembly. The interim Iraqi constitution, known as the Transitional Administration Law, adopted in March 2004, was designed to serve as a temporary constitution when the interim government took power on June 28, 2004.

Registration

The timetable for the election began in early November 2004 with voter registration. Political campaigning began in December 2004.[4] After the January 31, 2005 vote, the "Iraqi Interim Government" which assumed authority on June 30, 2004 was to be replaced by an elected "Iraqi Transitional Government."

Every Iraqi who holds Iraqi citizenship, provided he or she was born before January 1 1987, is eligible to vote. Voters are registered based on the UN "Oil for Food" rations lists. This system was adopted as there was insufficient time to conduct a population census. Iraqis obtain their registration forms from their ration card agents.[5] Iraqis also have the option of updating or correcting the information within this system if needed.[6]

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)

UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 stressed "the rights of the Iraqi People to choose in full freedom its political future."[7] A UN-appointed, eight-member Independent Electoral Commission made up of Iraqi citizens and one additional international expert was tasked with drawing up the election procedures and supervising its proceedings. The duties of the commission are stated as follows:

1. Determine, establish, develop, certify, subdivide, and maintain the voter roll.

2. Help build societal support for and confidence in the electoral process throughout Iraq.

3. Regulate and conduct the registration and certification of political parties.

4. Regulate and conduct the registration and certification of candidates for office.

5. Accredit election observers and other officers engaged in monitoring and / or observing elections in Iraq.

6. Manage the polling and ballot tabulation activities.

7. Adjudicate electoral grievances and disputes.

8. Certify election results.[8]

Any political organization or party must be approved as a "political entity" by the Commission before it can nominate candidates for an election. They can present a list of anywhere from a 12 names to 275 candidates for all the seats in the National Assembly.

Constituencies and the List System

Iraq constitutes a single constitutiency for the election of the Transitional Assembly because election organizers hoped this would provide for representation of far more different interest groups.[9] Thus, every voter in the country will have the same list of candidates to choose from rather than different ballots for each district.[10]

The advantage of such a single constituency system was stated in the Iraqi Communist Party newspaper, "Proportional representation and Iraq being a single constituency mean that there is no specific high percentage to win and enter parliament other than obtaining the necessary votes for one seat. By dividing the number of votes by 275, we get the number of votes necessary to get one seat."[11] In other words, rather than being based on the "winner-takes-all" system, the election is designed to ensure that any political faction or independent candidate can be elected to the Assembly if he or she gets a required number of votes.

The election commission also pointed out that the system also permits "groups and communities" as well as political parties to submit lists while also making it easier for independent candidates to run.[12] Each list is required to have at least one-quarter female candidates. No candidate can have been a high-ranking Ba'ath party official or have ties to any Iraqi insurgent groups. Ba'athists who did not commit any offensive acts against the Iraqi people, however, can run.

The National Assembly

The Iraqi candidates on these lists are to be elected to a 275-member transitional National Assembly. In the north, a separate election will occur simultaneously for candidates running for the local Kurdistan National Assembly. It is this Transitional Assembly that will later select the prime minister, president, two deputy presidents and other ministers. [13]

The tasks of the new National Assembly include drafting a permanent Iraqi constitution that will then be put to a public referendum for approval. The constitution will be ratified if approved by the majority of voters in Iraq in October 2005.[14] If the Iraqi public votes for the constitution, new elections will be held two months later. However, if the draft document fails to get the necessary votes, the Transitional National Assembly will be dissolved and a new Assembly will be elected to produce another constitution. Such a scenario could occur if two-thirds' of the population of three provinces object to the contents of the draft constitution. The Kurds who are dominant in the three northern provinces of Dohuk, Sulaymaniyya and Irbil could veto the constitution if their demands for autonomy or federalism are not met.[15]

A two-thirds' majority in the National Assembly will elect a president of the state and two vice-presidents to form a Presidential Council. The Presidential Council will then name the prime minister who in turn selects the members of his cabinet. This Assembly will have the power to approve the military actions of the Iraqi defense forces, as well as endorsing the budget and drafting laws.[16]

MOBILIZATION AND BOYCOTTS

The current thinking on the nature of Iraqi society is that it consists of three communities, the Arab Shi'as, Arab Sunnis and ethnic Kurds. However, dividing Iraq into these three distinct units is rather simplistic. There is a certain degree of cohesiveness, a sense of "Iraqiness," that persists until today among the country's various ethnic and confessional groups. Nevertheless, for the sake of organization, the following sections of this analysis will examine the various political parties in Iraq along ethnic and religious lines and how they have mobilized for the election.

The Shi'a

The Shi'a parties have been the strongest advocates that the elections be held on schedule. Since the creation of the Iraqi state, the Shi'a have been excluded from the higher echelons of power despite being the majority in the country. The elections represent their first opportunity to seize the helm of Iraq's politics.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) [17] is an Iranian-backed organization founded in 1982 as an umbrella group for anti-Saddam Shi'a groups. Its armed wing, known as the Badr Corps, was the largest and most organized Shi'a militia with a numerical strength estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 men. It was led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim who was killed in Najaf by a car bomb after delivering his Friday sermon in August 2003. Upon his death, his brother, 'Abdul-'Aziz al-Hakim took over leadership of the party.

SCIRI has encourage the Shi'a public to vote by using religious injunctions. For example, its newspaper featured a front page quote from Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad that called on-time elections "the first step in the right direction."[18] Another front-page article showcased a statement issued by Ayatollah al-Sayyid Kazim al-Ha'iri that urged Iraqis to participate in the upcoming elections "in order to foil the enemies' plans."[19] Perhaps most importantly, comments from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have appeared frequently; notable among them was his exhortation, "that even old people who need the support of others to walk must take part in the upcoming elections."[20] The Hizballah Movement in Iraq, an offshoot of SCIRI, has also played an active role in mobilizing the Shi'a to the polls, emphasizing that elections will accelerate the departure of the occupation forces.[21]

Muqtada Sadr, a 30-year-old cleric, inherited his father's credentials as a high- ranking Shi'a cleric opposing the Saddam Hussein government. His father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Sadr and two of his sons were murdered in 1999, allegedly by the Iraqi government. After a few years of hiding, Muqtada reappeared in Najaf when the American military captured the city in April 2003. He has not formed a cohesive political party per se, but he has emerged as a political force to be reckoned with, especially after mobilizing the militia knowan as the Mahdi Army to challenge U.S. forces in Najaf and the neighborhood of Sadr City in Baghdad.

His popularity rose considerably after confronting the US in April 2004. When asked, "Which National Leader do you Trust the Most?" only 1.5 percent of the respondents in a poll mentioned Sadr's name in February 2004. By June 2004 that figured jumped to 7.4 percent. While this number may not seem high, it represents the highest jump in popularity for any Iraqi political figure. Capitalizing on this trend, Sadr agreed to halt his armed campaign and take part in the political process. In October 2004, the Political Bureau of the Al-Sadr movement began negotiations with other political forces to prepare for the election.[22] It stated the intention to mobilize followers but insisted that Sadr himself would not be a candidate.[23] His faction accuses the United States of arresting his followers to subvert its political participation.[24]

The Iraqi National Congress was initially formed as an umbrella organization of diverse opposition groups, including Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni opponents of the Saddam regime. Its leader, Ahmad Chalabi, had called for a secular, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq while still preserving its territorial integrity. While once popular with officials in the U.S. Department of Defense, he was not favored by other U.S. government agencies and then was accused in Washington of having provided intelligence to Iran. Chalabi has used his Shi'a background to gain support among Iraq's majority, trying to capitalize on the popularity of the Al-Sadr movement by forming a joint organization in July 2004 known as the Shia Political Council.[25]

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the highly revered Shi'a cleric, has emerged as a decisive factor in the election. He has abstained from declaring membership in any Iraqi political faction or from taking an active part in the political process because he insists that clerics should not take a direct part in politics. Nevertheless, he has used his religious authority to bestow legitimacy on the Iraqi electoral process. His fatwas (Islamic religious rulings) have emphasized that he wants the elections to be held on time.[26] He has called upon all Iraqis, not just the Shi'a, to vote even calling for non-Muslims, such as the Iraqi Christians, as well as women to take an active part in the process.[27] "All eligible male and female voters should cast their votes and check that their names are correctly recorded in the voter registry. Voting is considered a religious duty similar to prayers and fasting, and your abstention constitutes disobedience of God Almighty.[28] The Sistani faction has also stressed that successful elections will be the only way to "expel the occupation."[29] One of Sistani's representatives made the alleged statement that anyone refusing "to participate in the elections is a traitor and will go to hell."[30] However, this particular remark was criticized widely.[31]

According to a September 2004 poll, religious sanction of the elections is crucial. When asked, "Please indicate how each of the following authorities' or figures' endorsement of a candidate or list of candidates would make you more or less inclined to support that list?" 40 percent of respondents said that a cleric's endorsement would make them more inclined to support a list.[32]

Shi'a factions have made veiled threats that if the elections were not held, they would take violent action. Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi said: "If the elections are delayed, there will be a real disaster and sedition, in which the American people bear responsibility for the tragedy that will happen to the Iraqi people." He went on to warn that, "the areas which are safe at present, will burn with fire if the elections are postponed."[33] Husayn al-Shahrastani, a former nuclear scientist with close connections to Sistani, said that if elections were postponed, "The peaceful Shi'a would have resorted to other options."[34] While it seems that the "other options" he alludes to refer to violence, it is also possible that he was intimating that the Shi'a might seek autonomy for the south where they predominate.[35]

Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Call Party), popularly known as al-Da'wa, is a Shi'a Islamist party established in the 1960s with the support of the prominent Iraqi Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr, who was executed by the Saddam government in 1980. It has also actively called for the Shi'a to take part in the elections. According to its newspaper:

"It behooves our oppressed people to take part in these elections. They must not fail, repeat past mistakes, and let nationalist, communal, and agent elements control the destiny of Iraq and its people anew in the name of democracy this time_.We must do all we can to guarantee a prosperous future for our children so that they will not suffer as we have suffered due to the slackness of our fathers in the last century.[36]

The "slackness of our fathers" refers to the period in Iraq's history when the Shi'a protested the British occupation in the 1920s by boycotting any political process. According to some Iraqis, these actions led to a cycle of Shi'a exclusion from Iraq' politics that continued up until the fall of the Saddam's government.

The Arab Sunnis

Most of the violence in Iraq today has been attributed to the Arab Sunnis' reaction to their loss of their monopoly on power. Many of the attacks directed against American forces and Iraqis working with the interim government originated from the so-called "Arab Sunni Triangle." Falluja has emerged as the focal point of this insurgency. Arab Sunni forces have linked their attitude toward the election to the fighting between U.S. forces and local militias there, which reached a peak in November 2004. The Association of Muslim Scholars has emerged as a prominent group representing the interests of the Arab Sunnis.[37] A statement delivered at a mosque in Baghdad, on behalf of 150 Sunni clerics representing the Association, stated, "If the city continues to be stormed and shelled with planes and artillery_we will_call for boycotting the elections and considering their results null and void."[38]

The group has stressed that it is not a political party and therefore cannot take part in the elections process but in its role as a religious authority for the Sunni Muslims, it will discourage constituents from participating in the vote.[39] A spokesman for the Association argued that while the Falluja attack was supposed to make the area safe for the elections; it in fact backfired. He projected that, "had the Al-Fallujah battle taken place after holding the elections, such a call would not have emerged.[40]

However, the Association does not represent the view of all Sunni Muslims and a debate has emerged within this community as to whether or not they should participate in the process. A Sunni author argues in one article that if the elections were to proceed with the Sunni boycott in place, the government and any constitution or parliament that emerged from it would lack legitimacy, being based on "a sectarian identity."[41] Even some Shi'a officials fear that an election without the Sunnis would hurt the legitimacy of the new government. Muwafiq Al-Rubay'i, a Shi'a and Iraq's national security advisor, said: "We hope, aspire, and plan as an interim Iraqi Government that all the sons of our people with all their political, religious, sectarian, racial, and ethnic backgrounds in every area, city, and town will take part in the elections because the credibility of this process and the elections stems from the participation of all the Iraqi people_.If one group decides to boycott the elections, the credibility of the elections and the future constitution to be drafted by the transitional National Assembly would be undermined."[42]

Other Sunni parties have encouraged their constituents to take part in the elections. The Iraqi Islamic Party is led by Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid, who had served on the interim Iraqi Governing Council. He announced that his party would take part in this process but would encourage delaying the elections until the security situation improves. One spokesman from the party stated, "Religious and national responsibility necessitates our participation in the upcoming elections."[43] The party recommended that the elections be delayed for at least six months.

The National Democratic Party, led by Nasir Chadirchi, is a non-sectarian party, although the leader happens to be Sunni. In their newspaper, they criticized the Association of Muslim Scholars' stance towards the election, arguing if it proceeds on schedule, "The Sunnis will be the big losers." The article also laments the fact that there are divisions among the Sunnis because they do not have a religious authority like Al-Sistani or Muqtada al-Sadr to unite them[44]

Another article encouraged the Sunnis not to boycott the elections or otherwise they would repeat the historic mistakes of the Shia: "In 1922, the Shiites experienced almost the same situation in which the Sunnis find themselves now." But even though they were a majority and the British authorities were ready to let them participate, they closed this door "with their own hands. Consequently they remained out of the circle of power_for another 80 years.[45] The Iraqi interim President, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir, himself a Sunni, made the same point to other Arab Sunnis "not to repeat the Shi'a's mistake."[46] Al-Yawir formed his own secular political party to take part in the elections, called the Iraqis Grouping (tajammu' iraqiyyun).[47]

Other groups not necessarily sectarian in nature, but led by Sunnis, decided to take part in the elections. For example, Iraq's Constitutional Monarchy Movement, led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, himself a Sunni, seeks to restore the Iraqi monarchy. The Independent Democrats Grouping, led by Adnan Pachachi, the former Iraqi foreign minister in the 1960ss, also agreed to take part in the elections, though he expressed doubts that the security situation in Iraq is suitable for such a process.

The Kurds and Turkmens

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was established in 1947 by Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, while a rival organization, The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed in 1977 under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. Kurdish candidates will participate in the elections on three levels: the Kurdistan assembly elections, Iraqi assembly, and governorate councils.[48]

The Turkmens (also seen as Turcomans) are Iraq's third largest minority and reside in the north of Iraq as well as in the oil-rich Kirkuk area. The Turkmens have been traditionally represented by the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a coalition. The Turkmens and Kurds have been engaged in a heated battle for the fate of Kirkuk. The Kurds have declared that they would like to see Kirkuk as their regional capital but the Turkmen have argued that they form the city's majority and therefore it should remain free of Kurdish control.

The Kurdish position on whether to hold or postpone the elections was mixed. Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, a former official in Talabani's PUK, has warned that postponing the Iraqi elections would have serious repercussions for Iraq's political development.[49] However, Falaq al-Din Kaka'i, editor of the newspaper representing the views of the KDP supported delayed elections, since the Kirkuk issue has not been satisfactorily resolved. Asked if the Kurdish parties were attempting to use the Kirkuk issue as a way to pressure the interim government to expedite a resolution of the issue of the city to their benefit. Kaka'i argued this was not the case but then answered the question with another question, "How will the rest of Kurds act if the Kirkuk Kurds do not participate in the elections for any reason?" [50]

Other Kurdish figures lobbied to postpone the provincial elections in Kirkuk until all Kurds displaced under the Saddam regime's Arabization effort in the city are returned to Kirkuk, thus bolstering Kurdish votes in the area. The most contentious issue is the Turkmen declaration that Iraqi Kurds have resorted to a violent campaign of intimidation in order to force them to leave Kirkuk. A politician in the Turkmen Front argued that the two Kurdish parties distributed 90,000 forged ration cards to Kurdish families that have recently arrived in Kirkuk to bolster their numbers in the upcoming elections. [51]

The Iraqi Turkmen Front has argued that their people have been marginalized in the Iraqi political process since the fall of the Saddam government. They hope to change this situation by at least securing 25 out of 275 parliamentary seats.[52] Other Turkmen parties have forged alliances with Shi'a factions. The Turkmen Islamic Union in Iraq praised al-Sistani's call to the Iraqis "to participate effectively in the forthcoming elections and register their names on the electorate list."[53]

The Formation of the Lists

There were more than 70 lists submitted by December 15, 2004, the deadline for the registration period. Nine of the lists were multiparty coalitions, while 66 were lists presented by single Iraqi parties.[54] Perhaps the most important of them is the "Unified Iraqi Coalition List" which submitted 228 candidates for the 275-member National Assembly. It represented 16 Iraqi political groups, among them the dominant Shi'a factions in Iraq. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, held the top position, followed by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari from the al-Da'wa Party. Ahmad Chalabi held the tenth position on the list. The list also included candidates from other communities as well as prominent chiefs of some Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a tribes, such as the Shammar, Jarba, Bani Asad and Bani Rijab.[55] Due to Sistani's endorsement of the list and Hakim's and Ja'afari's past ties to Iran, opponents of the list call it the Iranian list[56]

Both Kurdish parties ran together on what has been termed the Kurdish list.[57] Other multiparty coalitions lists include two lists, "The Iraqi Independent Bloc" led by Dr Ghassan al-Attiya and the Arab Democratic Front, which said they excluded anyone working for the current Iraqi administration, implying such people cooperated with the "occupation forces." [58] Iraq's interim prime minister and president each submitted their own lists of candidates. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and his party, the Iraqi National Accord have submitted a 240-candidate coalition, and Iraqi President Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir ran on an 80-person slate representing the Iraqi Grouping.[59]

Other single party lists include those presented by The Constitutional Monarchy Movement, The Iraqi Communist Party, and the Iraqi Turkmen Front. The Iraqi Islamic Party presented a list ticket with 275 candidates while still proposing that the election should "be delayed for at least six months."[60]

OBSTACLES TO THE ELECTIONS

Lack of Security

The worsening security situation in Iraq remains the greatest obstacle in holding nationwide elections in Iraq. This situation was graphically demonstrated in November when Iraqi elections officials were dragged out of their car in broad daylight and killed by Iraqi insurgents on a busy Baghdad street.[61] Election officials say they have received many threats from those alleging that the elections are perpetuating the "colonization and occupation" of Iraq, and attributing them to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers).[62]

In terms of logistics, there are question of how the Iraqi security forces can guarantee the safety of the polling stations, if these same forces can barely defend themselves. Lines of voters waiting to cast their ballot could be prime targets for Iraqi insurgents attempting to disrupt this process.

Groups linked to Zarqawi, like the Ansar al-Sunna Army, threatened to strike the polling centers and potential candidates running in the elections.[63] On November 18, 2004, they declared it would strike all election centers, considered "centers of blasphemy," and participants. It justified such attacks by declaring that:

"Islam is only God's dominion and does not belong to the majority nor to the party...whoever is chosen for these positions becomes an infidel, because he should know that he will rule according to infidel's rules_.Muslims who participate_will become infidels as well, because they well know that the one they elect will govern them with man made laws.[64]

Threats have also emerged from other factions in Iraq. In the restive city of Mosul, hundreds of boxes of voter registration forms were torched.[65] Fakhri al-Qaisy, head of the conservative Sunni Consultative Council on Fatwas and Islamic Orientation, said that there is no possibility for the Sunnis to take part in the elections and threatened violence if this boycott was breached, "We met to decide not to participate in these elections. If any party goes back on its decision, the resistance will fire its rockets at it."[66]

There are doubts that there are enough Iraqi security forces to maintain security during the election, as well as sufficient international monitors to review the process. Allawi stated that 400,000 police officers would be needed to provide security for the 9,000 electoral centers throughout Iraq.[67] The number of Iraq's security forces fall well below that number. Foreign Minister Hoshiar Zebari expressed "anxiety over the insufficient number of UN employees who will supervise the elections scheduled to be held at the beginning of next year."[68]

Nevertheless, restive areas such as Mosul and Falluja will not be excluded from taking part in the elections. This was justified by Farid Ayyar when he said, "Iraq is a single electoral district and it would be impossible to exclude one area. This is the law that binds us. Therefore, the elections must be held on all of Iraqi soil without any exception so that all the Iraqis can benefit from this new and unique democratic process."[69]

Despite the threat of violence, other Iraqis insisted the elections proceed on schedule. Shi'a proponents of the elections argued that while it may be marred by violence, the process in the long term could end terrorism in Iraq. The head of the al-Fadilah Islamic Party stated, "If they take place as scheduled, the Iraqis would have won this war. If postponed, terrorists would win and achieve their goals. Then, you can say goodbye to Iraq, God forbid. Postponing the elections is out of the question."[70] Muwafiq al-Rubay'i, Iraq's national security advisor said, "We cannot postpone the elections even for one day because this would mean terrorism, the saboteurs, and the enemies of democracy and Iraq have won. This would break the morale of the Iraqi people, which we would never allow to happen under any circumstances." He stressed that a newly elected government would have the authority to end the presence of U.S. troops on Iraqi soil, thus eliminating the justifications for violence carried out by insurgents opposed to the occupation.[71] The Al-Da'wa party also wrote that holding elections on schedule will help eliminate terrorism in the country.[72] SCIRI officials declared that postponing the elections would cause more insecurity and grant a victory to Iraqi insurgents: "Postponing the elections will serve their interests and objectives, and would encourage them to continue their war against Iraq, against the democratic transition, and against the elections."[73] When two deadly attacks occurred in the predominantly Shi'a cities of Najaf and Karbala to discourage people from participating in the elections, SCIRI described them as the "tax for adhering to the principle of elections." While they expect more attacks to be carried out, they insist that the elections be held as scheduled.[74]

Statements made during a poll conducted by the al-Ahali newspaper revealed the strength of some citizens' commitment to the elections. One interviewee said, "Through the elections, the Iraqi people will achieve its will through triumphing over the forces of darkness, killing, and abduction." One novelist even declared that: "I will go to polling stations even if the terrorists turn all ballot boxes into mines that tear up our bodies, because the elections are the only way to set up a democratic, prosperous Iraq; unify its sons, in all their sects, ethnicities, and political shades; and restore to the Iraqi people--which was marginalized throughout the time of the hateful dictatorship--its identity and citizenship."[75]

Other polls taken in October 2004 indicated that the majority of Iraqis favored holding the elections on schedule, with estimates ranging from 60 to 85 percent.[76]

The Failure to Form National Parties

Another obstacle to holding elections is that there are virtually no Iraqi political parties that have developed a strong grass roots' base or that transcend ethnic or sectarian differences. The parties in Iraq are either remnants of the opposition groups exiled during the Saddam era or based only on sectarian or ethnic affiliation. Perhaps the only exception to this trend is the Iraqi Communist Party (al-Hizb al-Shuyyu'i al-'Iraqi) founded in 1934. While it not based on any ethnic or sectarian ideology, it does not have a wide following in Iraq.

Polls conducted inside Iraq support this assessment. One survey found that 63 percent agreed, "There is not yet a party in Iraqi that represents my interests or views."[77] Of those polled, 49 percent said, "I do not trust them at all," when asked about political parties.[78] When asked, "Whether or not you support a political party right now, please tell me which of the following factors would be most important to you in choosing a party to vote for in Iraq's first elections?" The first priority was for the party to be able to "maintain order and stability," while party ideology was ranked third indicating that no political faction in Iraq has managed to articulate a platform or agenda that has widespread appeal.[79] According to a poll conducted between February and March 2004, by the Gulf Research Center (GRC) based in Dubai, 75 percent of those surveyed did not belong to a political party, and, of those, 87 percent said they refused to join one because they "do not trust the parties.[80]

Some critics have complained the Iraqi political landscape is dominated by the former exiled parties.[81] Others have claimed the United States gives financial support to parties it favors, not allowing independent parties to emerge or complying with true democracy.[82] The National League for Iraqi Intellectuals and Academics criticized political parties for trying to incorporate civil society organizations "under their umbrellas" instead of bolstering their role in the society.[83]

Failings in Voter Education

Some have criticized the electoral authorities for failing to educate Iraqis sufficiently about the election process. For example, an Iraqi interviewed on a local station stated that many Iraqis do not the meaning of words such as "constituency," "political entity," or "unified list."[84] Another person in a newspaper survey stated that the average Iraqi thinks he is voting for the president or prime minister and does not realize that he will be voting for the assembly that will select these two.[85] Even the Election Commission spokesperson Ayyar admitted that according to a poll, "74 percent of Iraqis think these are presidential elections because that is the way they are used to things." He said the commission would work to make it clear to all the Iraqis "that these are parliamentary elections to elect 275 members" of the interim assembly.[86] The Voice of Mujahadin radio station declared that writers and intellectuals "must shoulder their responsibility in contributing toward election awareness, given that they are the fourth estate in activating the society and steering it toward the promising elections."[87]

Others have pointed to the media's responsibility. The SCIRI paper al-'Adala stated that Iraqis have no previous experience in democracy and thus it is the responsibility of the media to express a "diversity of opinion" on this subject to help "nurture the experience of democracy in the country."[88] The al-Sabah newspaper featured an article entitled, "The Necessity of Elections Education," stating that the Iraqi media is very weak in comparison with the other Arab media, and thus could not, "Fulfill its national responsibilities of educating people for the upcoming elections."[89] One engineer said in an interview:

"Many Iraqis do not have the slightest idea about the method of holding these elections. I am one of those people, and I did not have a clear idea about the formula of presenting the lists of candidates, the nature of possible constituencies, or the candidates and their party or independent orientations. I am greatly prepared to participate in the elections, which are considered a clean lung from which Iraq will breathe freedom and democracy, but on the condition that the government pay attention to the media aspect and inform its citizens of all matters related to voting."[90]

These comments echo the results of the IRI poll. When asked, "In your opinion, which of the following would be the best way for a party to get you attention?" more than 50 percent cited television advertisements, the highest percentage.[91]

The Independent Elections' Commission attempted to mobilize the Iraqis through a media education program. The commission produced a 45-minute publicity movie, more than a half a million posters, and ten million brochures to be distributed to raise public awareness on the elections.[92] The commission issued a daily publication called "Your Vote Is the Future" (Sawtuka al-Mustaqbal) which featured such headlines as, "Your contribution to the election is an evidence of your love for your country"

and "Vote for the sake of future; vote for the sake of Iraq."[93]

Other elements in Iraq's society have done their part in terms of voter education and promoting voter turn-out. The independent Iraqi satellite television station, al-Sharqiyya was also instrumental in encouraging the Iraqis to vote featuring both commercials and interviews among average Iraqis that stress the importance of voting, as well as features with prominent figures involved in the elections.[94] Sistani's offices have put up posters around Iraq featuring his fatwa encouraging the Iraqis to vote.[95] Governorates in Baghdad and Basra initiated cultural programs on elections for youths of both sexes in the areas, while the al-'Amara governorate established the Iraqi Society Towards Democracy, whose goals were "spreading democratic concepts among people and preparing them for the upcoming elections."[96]

Other civil society organizations have played a role in this process, such as the Civil Dialogue Organization which helped explain to the public the method of conducting the elections and the need for active participation in the process. The Human Rights Society in the province of Babil for example held education programs on the elections."[97] Other tribally based organizations, such as The Islamic Conference for Iraqi Tribes have also held seminars on voter education.[98] Political parties have maintained campaigns to mobilize the public as well as to educate them about the electoral process. The al-Da'wa party for example organized a mass meeting in the al-Sha'ab district in Baghdad to discuss the election situation.[99]

According to the interim Iraqi elections law the percentage of women's representation in the National Assembly must not be less than 25 percent. Therefore, the nomination lists have been made up accordingly, often having as many as 33 percent women, to guarantee reaching this proportion.[100] Special attempts have been made to mobilize Iraqi women to vote in the upcoming elections. Female politicians have conducted their own effort to encourage women to vote by holding forums and conferences as well as visits to the governorates in order to educate women.[101]

THE IRAQI ELECTIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

After the dismantlement of the Saddam Hussein government, many Iraqis questioned whether the United States had a genuine interest in fostering a democracy in Iraq. A common notion in Iraq is that the United States did not genuinely support a democracy in a post-Saddam government. The average Iraqi believes that it was part of U.S. foreign policy during the Iran-Iraq war that kept Saddam Hussein in power. Most Iraqis knew that the United States gave military and intelligence support to their former tyrant to make sure Saddam emerged victorious over Khomeini's Iran. This relationship was inflated to the point in Iraq where many Iraqis themselves believed that Saddam was a CIA agent. For example, one Iraqi newspaper, refers to the former dictator as "the Americans' obedient servant, Saddam, who offered them everything, but they refused to let him stay."[102]

Another belief in Iraq is that the United States will not support its democracy because the majority of its people are Shi'a and its post-Saddam leader would most likely be a Shi'a. In their opinion, the United States would be wary of such a leader because he might possibly form an alliance with Shi'a Iran and then dominate the Gulf. Ironically, it is from the Shi'a clerics, that America feared would try to engineer an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq, that the most strident calls for democracy have emerged. Sistani, the country's most influential Shi'a leader, in March 2004 rejected a U.S. formula to transfer power to the Iraqis via a provisional legislature selected by eighteen regional caucuses.

Some Iraqis are convinced that the United States is working behind the scenes to manipulate the elections to its advantage. One writer in the independent daily al-Furat stated that a Washington Post article described how the U.S. Administration allocated millions of dollars to support some Iraqi figures and parties in the coming elections and that U.S. intelligence agencies will be involved behind the scenes to guarantee a favorable outcome where Iraq would emerged as an "American village controlled by the White House without a reference ever being made to the Iraqi people."[103]

An article in the SCIRI paper Al-'Adala stated that while the Iraqis are looking forward to transparent elections free of corruption, many fear that:

"The United States dethroned Saddam and invaded Iraq for its own benefit, not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Therefore, the United States is not ready to lose control over Iraq. Such is the case when a group of people who would never fulfill its interests or oppose it if they were to win the elections. This is why the United States' call for elections may be no more than propaganda for its own elections or slogans to be raised, not a fact to be reached."[104]

The writer emphasizes that U.S. interference in the elections is likely because, "The United States and the West in general work solely for their own interests, disregarding other peoples' interests." He argues that the Bush administration will push ahead the elections to prove the invasion of Iraq was a success.[105] Another writer from the independent daily paper al-Ufuq stated, "The Iraqi elections will give Bush the image of a man who kept his word in achieving democracy in Iraq and turning the country into a model for the Middle East. Therefore, it is apparent that the U.S. administration is determined to hold the polls even if that means certain areas will be exempted from participation."[106]

Muqtada al-Sadr has also expressed his distrust of U.S. motives for supporting the elections. He said in a speech, "Is there anyone who asks: 'If I participate in the elections, will the occupiers leave my country? Won't they rig the elections, and by doing so deny power to the pious?' All they care for is to empower a puppet who gives his consent to the occupiers to stay in our country and gain the legitimacy rejected by the United Nations and others."[107] One of his representatives said, "We see no one benefiting from the elections but the occupation, Bush, and his followers and supporters. This is because the elections will be won by personalities demanding the continuation of the occupation and supported by the occupation. Had the United States been serious about the success of the elections, it would have assured the Iraqi people and announced a timetable for ending the occupation, by which time a fairly-elected national government would be formed."[108]

Proponents of holding the elections on time repeated their assertion that the vote will be Iraq's first step in ending the occupation. A representative of the Iraqi Communist party said, "Let them say what they want. The final word will be for the Iraqi people. If we choose a legitimate government through democratic elections and if we enable it to restore its national decision, it will be able to ask the foreign forces to leave Iraq as quickly as possible. It will thus be protected by international law and the support of the whole world."[109]

THE IRAQI ELECTIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Iraqis have expressed opinions criticizing the authoritarian nature of Arab regimes and have blamed them for undermining the Iraqi elections. The paper al-Sabah al-Jadid, an independent daily, carried a front-page editorial stating the Iraqi elections are unprecedented in the Arab world where their "leaders get 99.99 percent of the votes without any opposition."[110] One newspaper stated while none of the countries in the region has opposed or rejected holding elections in Iraq, some of them wish that these elections would fail so that they will not feel the pressure to liberalize their own political systems.[111]

Farid Ayar, spokesman of the Iraqi Independent Elections Committee was particularly critical of the Arab media which he states incites terrorism in Iraq and thus undermines the elections:

"We are aware how some Arab satellite channels are_setting traps and trying to impose their political agendas on the Iraqi people....The Iraqi people will exercise their right to elections and will definitely succeed in establishing a democratic and free regime on Iraqi soil that would set an example for many countries that should follow suit in the future."[112]

Indeed, some of the media in the Arab world has encouraged the Iraqis to resist the United States and not take part in the elections. For example, a writer from Jordan, Yasir al-Za'atira, stated:

"It is obvious that the option of boycotting the elections and refusing to give legitimacy to the election process is the best option not only to the Sunni Arabs but also to Iraq and all the Iraqis as well as to the Umma (Muslim nation). Along with the boycott, the resistance will proceed ahead until it ends the occupation, wrests full independence and genuine sovereignty, and restores the political presence of those that rejected and resisted against the occupation rather than to those who collaborated with the occupation and sought to uphold its interests." [113]

Ahmed Chalabi responded that the real fear among foreign Arab critics was that Iraq's democracy will spread to their nations:

"The elections are the only solution for ending Iraq's predicament and are a resounding slap in the face of the Bedouins [Arab Gulf states] and the terrorists who do not want what is good for Iraq, because_their peoples will ask them for democracy, sooner or later. The winds of change are definitely coming to them, since they do not want democracy to spread in Iraq, and they are yearning for the return of their idol [Saddam Hussein] and his henchmen to power. This will never happen in the new Iraq, whatever happens and no matter what they do and how much they plot against us."[114]

The Shi'a parties, as advocates for holding the elections, also criticized the Arab world's attempts to obstruct the elections. The SCIRI newspaper also claims that they "fear the infection" of democracy in their own countries.[115] One article criticized Arab leaders, such as Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and the Jordanian king Abdullah for attempting to obstruct the elections in Iraq, fearing the control of the Shiites and Kurds over the country.[116] Another article criticized foreign countries who sought to interfere in the Iraqi elections, affirming that no one should interfere in a purely Iraqi affair.[117] The al-Da'wa party paper also lashed out at non-Iraqi media, clerics, and intellectuals as trying "to kill the new-born offspring in its cradle" and issuing "statements full of spite for Iraq and the Iraqis. They supported and named terrorism 'honest resistance.'"[118] The Iraqi Communists have taken a similar position.[119]

CONCLUSION

The dilemma of the elections in domestic Iraqi terms was well summarized by one Al-Jazira journalist as follows: "The Shi'a authorities emphasize that those who will not participate in the elections will burn in hell but the Sunni fatwas stress that participation in the upcoming elections is a sin against God."[120] If the Sunnis heed the religious injunctions against voting, or simply fail to participate due to the security situation in their areas, the legitimacy of the elected Iraqi government will ultimately suffer.

The prospect of a Sunni boycott does not bode well for Iraq's future. Sunnis who felt they have been excluded from the political process in post-Saddam Iraq have used violence to make their protests heard. If the 2005 elections isolate them again, they will most likely continue to use violence to address their grievances. However, failure to hold the elections also posed risks. A delay would inflame the Shi'a element who may then take out their frustration against U.S. forces in Iraq. The fact that Shi'a proponents of the elections are arguing that this process will be the first step in ending the US occupation is an indication of such trends. Additionally, delaying the elections would have proven to the insurgents that their tactics have been successful and will only embolden them to continue their campaign, making the hope for an end to violence in Iraq even more remote.

NOTES

[1] George Grassmuck, _The Electoral Process in Iraq 1952-1958,_ The Middle East Journal, Vol. 14 (1960), pp., 397-415.

[2] Adeed I. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, _How to Build a Democratic Iraq_, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003.

[3] Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, _Democracy in Iraq?_, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 123.

[4] _Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging Nationwide Participation,_ Al-Bayan , Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[5] _Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance toward Elections,_ Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP2004102400000923, October 24, 2004, p. 2.

[6] _Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging Nationwide Participation,_ Al-Bayan , (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[7] Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, <http://www.ieciraq.org>.

[8] Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.

[9] Institute for War and Peace Reporting, _Iraqi Elections Backgrounder,_ available at <www.iwpr.net>.

[10] _Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging Nationwide Participation,_ Baghdad Al-Bayan , (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[11] _Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance Toward Elections,_ Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP20041024000009, October 23, 2004, p. 2.

[12] Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.

[13] _Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance Toward Elections,_ Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP20041024000009, October 23, 2004, p. 2.

[14] Ibid., p. 2.

[15] Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

[16] _Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging Nationwide Participation,_ Al-Bayan , (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[17] Also seen as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) or Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI).

[18] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[19] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041014000275, October 14, 2004.

[20] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041016000208, October 16, 2004.

[21] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041026000248, October 26, 2004.

[22] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041030000149, October 30, 2004.

[23] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 30, 2004.

[24] Ibid.

[25] _Iraq: Media Report Pre-Election Maneuvering of Shia Parties, Al-Sadr Groups,_ (FBIS) GMF20040910000231, September 10, 2004.

[26] _Talk Show on Iraqi Elections, Proportional Representation, Al-Sistani's Fatwa,_ Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041018000258, 0825 GMT, October 18, 2004.

[27] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041030000149, October 3, 2004.

[28] _Al-Sistani Office Offers Voting Guidelines,_ Al-Diyar Television (FBIS) GMP20041030000206, 0603 GMT, October 30, 2004.

[29] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041030000149, October 30, 2004.

[30] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041023000216, October 23, 2004.

[31] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041031000181, October 31, 2004.

[32] _Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion: September 24-October 4, 2004,_ International Republican Institute (IRI) available at <www.iri.org>.

[33] __Wanted_ Cleric Urges Boycott of Iraq Elections, Another Wants Elections on Time,_ Al-Manar al-Yawm, (FBIS) GMP20041107000119, November 6, 2004, p. 1.

[34] _Iraq Election Monitor: TV Brings Out the Vote; Delay Criticized,_ (FBIS) GMF20041204000001, December 3, 2004.

[35] Ibid.

[36] _Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging Nationwide Participation,_ Al-Bayan , (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, 25 October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[37] _Sunni Clerics Bartering Election Participation for Al-Fallujah Shelling Halt,_ Al-Mashriq, (FBIS) GMP20041024000016, October 23, 2004, p. 2.

[38] _Iraq Election Monitor: Party Maneuvering, Sunni Boycott, Expat Vote,_ (FBIS) GMF20041029000223 October 29, 2004.

[39] _Iraqi Paper Interviews Government, Opposition Figures on Coming Elections,_ Al-Ufuq , (FBIS) GMP20041025000267, October 25, 2004, p. 3.

[40] _AMS Spokesman Cited on Plan, Conditions Set for Participation in Iraqi Elections,_ Iraq For All News Network, (FBIS) GMP20041204000088, December 4, 2004.

[41] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041026000248, October 26, 2004.

[42] _Iraqi Security Adviser Interviewed on Elections, _Foreign Presence,_ Al-Zarqawi,_ Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS) GMP20041029000016, 0952 GMT, October 26, 2004.

[43] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041030000149, October 30, 2004

[44] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041020000292, October 20, 2004.

[45] _Iraqi Article Urges Sunnis Not To Boycott Elections,_ Al-Shira, (FBIS) GMP20041028000237, October 27, 2004, p. 2.

[46] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041109000257, November 9, 2004.

[47] _Iraqi President Al-Yawir Forms _Secular_ Political Party to Run in Elections,_ Al-Diyar Television , (FBIS) GMP20041123000268, 1700 GMT, November 23, 2004.

[48] _Four Kurdish Parties Meet in Irbil, Issue Statement on Elections,_ Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP20041030000171, October 30, 2004, p. 1.

[49] _Barham Salih Says Postponing Elections to Have _Serious Repercussions,__ Al-Arabiyah Television , (FBIS) GMP20041128000148, 1415 GMT, November 28, 2004.

[50] _Iraqi Figures Discuss Calls for Postponing Elections, Dialogue with Opposition,_ Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television , (FBIS) GMP20041128000207, 1715 GMT, November 28, 2004.

[51] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041110000224, November 10, 2004.

[52] _Turkoman Front Leader on Participation in Elections, Situation in Kirkuk,_ Al-Mustaqbal, (FBIS) GMP20041129000241, November 29, 2004.

[53] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections Iraq,_ (FBIS) GMP20041021000163, October 20, 2004.

[54] _Election Official Says 70 Electoral Lists Received,_ Al-Sharqiyah Television , (FBIS) GMP20041213000095, 1100 GMT, December 13, 2004.

[55] _Unified Elections List Represents Various Iraqi Sectors, Ethnic Backgrounds,_ Al-Najaf News Network, (FBIS) GMP20041215000084, December 14, 2004.

[56] _Iraq Al-Sha'lan Calls List Backed by Al-Najaf Religious Authority _Iranian_ List_ Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041215000090, 1100 GMT, December 15, 2004.

[57] _Kurdish Parties Run for Legislative Elections with an Independent List,_ Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, (FBIS) GMP20041202000023, 0515 GMT, December 2, 2004.

[58] _Al-Sharqiyah Further Reports on Electoral Lists of Iraqi Political Entities,_ Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041215000209, 1305 GMT, December 15, 2004.

[59] _Iraq Election Monitor: Sunni Party on List, Obstacles to Expat, Kurd Votes,_ (FBIS) GMF20041218000002, December 17, 2004.

[60] _Iraqi Paper Reports Names Included in Independent , Coalition Tickets,_ Al-Mashriq , (FBIS) GMP20041214000271, December 13, 2004, p. 1.

[61] _Three Iraqi Election Office Staff _Gunned Down_ in Baghdad,_ AFP, December 19, 2004.

[62] _Letters to Iraqi Commission Demand Cancelling Elections, Include Threats,_ Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041031000104, 1100 GMT October 31, 2004.

[63] _Iraqi Islamic Group Threatens To Target Polling Centers,_ Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041118000219, 0610 GMT, November 18, 2004.

[64] _Jihadist Websites: Ansar Al-Sunnah Army Threatens Iraqi Elections; Tips on Ambushing US Helicopters,_ (FBIS) GMP20041118000268, November 18, 2004.

[65] Sam Dagher, _Iraqi Voter Registration Forms Burned by Insurgents in Mosul,_ AFP, November 20, 2004.

[66] _Iraqi Salafist Official Defends Margaret Hassan_s Murder,_ Liberation, (FBIS) EUP20041118000039, November 18, 2004.

[67] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041031000181, October 31, 2004.

[68] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041025000184, October 25, 2004.

[69] _Al-Arabiyah TV Talk Show Discusses Iraqi Elections,_ Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041122000264, 1905 GMT, November 22, 2004.

[70] _Iraqi Party Official Condemns Recruits_ _Senseless_ Deaths; Discusses Elections, Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS) GMP20041026000118, October 25, 2004.

[71] _Iraqi Security Adviser Interviewed on Elections, _Foreign Presence_, Al-Zarqawi,_ Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS) GMP20041029000016, 0952 GMT, October 26, 2004.

[72] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections , (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[73] _SCIRI Official Issues Statement Rejecting Calls To Postpone Iraq Elections,_ (Internet) Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, (FBIS) GMP20041123000227, November 23, 2004.

[74] _SCIRI Official Says Al-Najaf, Karbala Attacks Seek To Obstruct Iraq Elections,_ Al-Manar Television , (FBIS) GMP20041219000216, 1840 GMT, December 19, 2004.

[75] _Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of Elections,_ (FBIS) Al-Ahali, GMP2004102000023, October 20, 2004, p. 8.

[76] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041022000107, October 22, 2004; _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041021000163, October 20, 2004; International Republican Institute Survey.

[77] International Republican Institute Survey.

[78] Ibid

[79] Ibid.

[80] _Iraq_..Where To? Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted by the Gulf Research Council (GRC) in Iraq, February-March 2004,_ Gulf Research Council, available at <www.grc.ae>.

[81] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[82] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041016000208, October 16, 2004.

[83] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[84] _Iraqi TV Al-Fayha Program Reports Care Aid Chief Abduction, Discusses Elections,_ Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS) GMP20041020000234, 0900 GMT, October 20, 2004.

[85] _Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of Elections,_ Al-Ahali, (FBIS) GMP20041020000233, October 20, 2004, p. 8.

[86] _Al-Arabiyah TV Talk Show Discusses Iraqi Elections,_ Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041122000264, 1905 GMT, November 22, 2004.

[87] _Mujahidin Radio Blames Election Commission for _Slow_ Work, Calls for Active Media,_ Voice of the Mujahidin, (FBIS) GMP20041103000056, 0620 GMT, November 2, 2004.

[88] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041107000235, November 7, 2004.

[89] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041109000257, November 9, 2004.

[90] _Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of Elections,_ Al-Ahali, (FBIS) GMP20041020000233, October 20, 2004, p. 8.

[91] International Republican Institute Survey.

[92] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections ,_ (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[93] _Iraq Election Monitor: Iraq_s Independent Electoral Commission Publishes Daily on Election Affairs,_ (FBIS) GMP20041209000085, December 5, 2004.

[94] _Iraq Election Monitor: TV Brings Out the Vote; Delay Criticized,_ (FBIS) GMF20041204000001, December 3, 2004.

[95] _Iraq Election Monitor: Al-Sistani's Fatwa, Posters Urge Iraqis to Participate in Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041211000033, December 11, 2004.

[96] _Iraq Election Monitor: Start of Election Activity, Debate over Delay,_ (FBIS) GMF20041021000290, October 21, 2004.

[97] _Iraqi Paper Reports on Conference on Elections in Babil Governorate,_ Al-Mada, (FBIS) GMP20041024000194, October 24, 2004, p. 6.

[98] _Roundup of Iraqi Press of 26 October Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041028000168, October 28, 2004.

[99] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.

[100] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 3, 2004.

[101] _Iraqi National Assembly Member: Women_s Rights _Mere Propaganda__, Al-Mada, (FBIS) GMP20041025000244, October 25, 2004, p. 6.

[102] _Iraq: _Those Who Pant for American Carrot,_ _Patience of the Hopeful_ Mocked,_ Al-Hawzah, (FBIS) GMP20041125000220, November 4, 2004.

[103] _Writer Sees 'Intervention' by 'US Intelligence' in Iraqi Elections,_ Al-Furat, (FBIS) GMP20041024000095, October 24, 2004, p. 3.

[104] _Iraqi Commentary Says United States Serious About Holding Elections,_ Al-Adalah, (FBIS) GMP20041031000010, October 27, 2004, p. 12.

[105] Ibid.

[106] _Iraqi Writer Says Polls a Dilemma for All, Whether Held on Time or Delayed,_ Al-Ufuq, (FBIS) GMP20041105000184, November 2, 2004, p. 4.

[107] _Muqtada al-Sadr Message Urges Troops to Quit Iraq _Straight Away_ After Election,_ Al-Hawzah, (FBIS) GMP20041125000239, November 11, 2004, p. 1.

[108] _Al-Sadr Urges SCIRI, Al-Da_wah Party to Reconsider December Decision to Run for Elections,_ Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, (FBIS) GMP20041202000181, 1324 GMT, December 2, 2004.

[109] _Iraqi Communist Party Leader Views Electoral Program, Obstacles to Elections,_ Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041219000187, 1605 GMT, December 19, 2004.

[110] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections_ (FBIS) GMP20041024000144, October 24, 2004.

[111] _Iraqi Writer Discusses Two _Wagers_ on Iraqi Elections,_ Al-Bayan, (FBIS) GMP20041024000007, October 23, 2004, p. 3.

[112] _Iraqi TV Al-Fayha Program Reports Care Aid Chief Abduction, Discusses Elections,_ Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS) GMP20041020000234, 0900 GMT, October 20, 2004.

[113] _Arab Writer Argues in Support of Sunni Arab Boycott of Elections in Iraq,_ Al-Hayah, (FBIS) GMP20041109000305, November 1, 2004, p. 9.

[114] _INC Head Chalabi on Debt To Gulf States, Security Situation, Other Issues,_ Al-Bayyinah, (FBIS) GMP20041128000160, November 27, 2004, p. 14.

[115] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041025000275, October 25, 2004.

[116] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 3, 2004.

[117] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,_ (FBIS) GMP20041024000144, October 24, 2004.

[118] _Baghdad Paper Explores Benefits of Political Process, Assails Saudi Fatwa,_ Al-Bayan, (FBIS) GMP20041123000204, November 22, 2004, p. 3.

[119] _Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections ,_ (FBIS) GMP20041026000248 Iraq, October 26, 2004.

[120] _Iraq Elections Monitor: Iraqi Sunni Figures Discuss Iraqi Election Prospects; Sharm al-Shaykh Conference,_ (FBIS) GMP20041025000217, , October 24, 2004.

Ibrahim Al-Marashi (Ph.D. Oxford University) is a post-doctoral fellow at Sabanci University. He was a consultant to the Iraq Analysis Center in New York and a lecturer at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as well as a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

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