Cambridge Forecast Group Blog: Backup

CFG LOGO

Visit: Main Blog: Cambridge Forecast Group Blog

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP: OVERVIEW OF IMAGES

CFG: "Unsustainable Patterns of World Economic Growth" 1998

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP

Unsustainable Patterns of World Economic Growth

http://www.geocities.com/lance_feiner/

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CURRENT CRISIS 1998

A Handbook for Progressive Policy Makers

(By the Green Policy Group of The Other Economic Summit)

More precisely, from 1985 to the present, the US has been imposing a series of unsustainable economic and financial bubbles on various regions of the world successively (first Japan and Europe, then Asia, then Latin America, then China, etc.) in order to satisfy its insatiable demand for exports. Countries and regions have been overwhelmed by floods of outside capital, which they had neither the social nor economic institutions to deal with. A more viable policy would be the promotion of economic growth in more areas of the world simultaneously, but at a slower and more sustainable pace. Africa and the Arab world should not be written off as “basket cases” to be left to the dictates of a fickle global financial market.

As of this writing, policy makers are urging Japan to become the “locomotive” for Asia. Poor people in Asia are being asked to reduce their consumption, even as rich people in Japan are being asked to increase theirs. It seems that we’re back to ”Western-led growth” again. However, the only real “locomotive” for global and American economic growth, the only “locomotive” that doesn’t turn out to be a “bubble” is the alleviation of Third World poverty and the promotion of Third World sustainable development.

CONTENTS:

● Introduction

●         A Brief, Long-Term History of Globalization

●         Globalization Since 1945

●         Neoliberalism

●         The Third World

●         The American Economy, What Went Wrong Since 1965

●         The Role of The Transnational Corporations

●         Cuts in U.S. Social Entitlements And Globalization

●         Economic Growth And Sustainable Development

●         Anti-Third World Populism in The West

●         Circumventing Anti-Third World Populism, How Not To Do It

●         A Twenty Six Year History of Global “Quick Fixes”

●         Advice for Policy Makers

●         Conclusions

GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Introduction

This handbook presents a brief geographical and historical overview of the various financial/ political crises, which have been taking place in the world lately. If you’ve been feeling confused by them, the following material might be helpful.

A Brief, Long-Term History of Globalization

“Globalization” is not an entirely new phenomenon. Defined broadly, globalization, for better or worse, is simply the recurrence (this time on a global scale) of a process of political /cultural/economic consolidation, that has occurred many times in the past, on a very large regional scale. (i.e. the sinification of the Chinese subcontinent, the Aryanization of the Indian subcontinent, and the Hellenization of the Near East and the Mediterranean world.) “Globalization” is simply the 500-year period of Europeanization (and later Americanization) of the rest of the world.

European civilization’s five hundred year period of technological progress and geographical expansion has often been called unique, unparalleled in human history, completely different from anything in pre-European or non-European societies. This is not quite true however. Chinese civilization did undergo a similar process some 2000 years earlier, during its so-called “period of warring states” (500-250 B.C.). Competition between the “warring states” led to rapid technological and economic advance. It also led to massive geographical expansion via colonization (because of an outflow of refugees from the wars). Europe’s period of state formation, on the other hand, occurred 2,000 years later than China’s. Europe was thus heir to an additional 2,000 years of global technological and social advance. Because of advances in naval technology, and because of global linkages created by Arab and Mongol conquests, Europe’s expansion took place on a global rather than on a regional scale. Thus, whereas China’s “late start” (its iron age began in 500 B.C.) enabled it to develop a particularly successful and durable form of the “tributary mode”, Europe’s “late start”, 2,000 years later, enabled it to transcend the “tributary mode” altogether, and progress to industrial capitalism.

In other words, “Globalization” is nothing more than the five hundred year period of “Europeanization” (and, more recently, ”Americanization”) that the world has been subject to.

The globalization process was accelerated dramatically during the industrial revolution. By the beginning of this century, it had evolved into a system of global capitalism, linking together armed, mutually hostile industrial states and moribund empires (which were themselves rapidly industrializing even as they disintegrated). The globalization process collapsed temporarily during the catastrophes of the 1914 – 1945 period. It resumed again in 1945, under American hegemony, and was again dramatically accelerated by the post-war “technological revolution” (computers, transistors, containerization, the “green revolution”, communications satellites and the integrated circuit).

Globalization Since 1945

Contemporary critics of globalization usually do not begin with a 500-year history of the West’s rise to global dominance. Wolfgang Sachs, for example, (The Dictionary of Sustainable Development, Zed Books, 1992) concentrates his attention on the consequences of the ideology of “developmentalism” promulgated by Truman in the 1940′s and adopted by the Third World elites. David C. Korten, on the other hand, (When Corporations Rule The World, Kumarian Publishers, 1995) discusses the derangements brought about by the last twenty years of globalization.

Neoliberalism

When most people use the term “globalization”, they really mean “neoliberalism”. Neoliberalism (or “globalization” if you will) has attracted widespread criticism in recent years from such diverse sources as Pope John Paul, Ralph Nader, and (believe it or not) financier George Soros. The thrust of this criticism is that neoliberalism puts all of global society and all of global ecology onto a roulette wheel known as the “global capital markets”, and spins this roulette wheel, with God knows what consequences to the human future.

However, the point here is not to criticize neoliberalism, whose failings by now should be apparent to everyone, but rather to describe what it is, how it came about, and how it is likely to change.

First of all, the “liberalism” in neoliberalism does not mean “New Deal/Great Society” liberalism. It means “19th century British liberalism”; the policy of laissez-faire economics within nations, and the free, unfettered flow of commodities and capital between nations. “Neo”-”liberalism”, thus, means the late 20th century version of 19th century British liberalism; the privatization of the economies within nations, and the free, unfettered flow of commodities and capital between nations. Neoliberalism is usually portrayed as an inevitable consequence of changes in communications technology, the inevitable yielding of governments to the unstoppable “global marketplace”. Neoliberalism, however, is actually a global political construct, whose purpose was to regulate the process of globalization to (short term) U.S. advantage. It has far more to do with the U.S. political process, than with some Svengali-like takeover of national governments by multinational corporations.

Here is how it came about. At the 1979 economic summit in Belgrade, an elaborate scheme of Western/OPEC financial coordination was worked out to end global inflation and refinance Third World debt, without at the same time, collapsing global economic demand. Although this scheme involved a certain loss of US financial hegemony, it was reluctantly accepted by the Carter administration in the summer of 1980. There was much discussion of this plan in the mainstream business press. For example, a New York Times article (June 23, 1980) discussed how European heads of state voiced support for Western/OPEC cooperation to address world economic problems and in light of that, also for a timely resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. By the end of 1980, however, this scheme was increasingly thrown into doubt by the outbreak of the Iraq/Iran war. In 1982, it was finished off entirely by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.

After two years of blundering, the Reagan administration patched together an alternative to Western/OPEC financial coordination. Interest rates were kept very high, but were no longer increasing exponentially. A massive tax cut was accompanied by a massive increase in military spending, keeping U.S. consumer demand high. The American market was thrown open to all comers. In addition, foreign exporters were given a competitive advantage by the high dollar.

America, thus, became the world’s “lender and importer of last resort”. Third World debt continued to grow, but was increasingly being dwarfed by U.S. debt. In essence, Reagan “bribed” large parts of the American middle class and large parts of the Third World bourgeoisie, and did so “on tick” (by borrowing from countries with trade surpluses). In this way, he established a sort of “global consensus” for his policies.

The Reagan administration set to work on a long term approach to North/South economic relations, an approach that was later to become known as “neoliberalism”, or the “NAFTA/GATT” approach to North/South economic relations. Under neoliberalism, the rich countries agree to open their markets to labor intensive Third World manufactured exports, in return for which Third World countries agree to remove restrictions on private outside capital placements. Markets are also opened for high-tech products and services. (The winners the U.S., the losers potentially everyone else ).

Neoliberalism was conceived by the Reagan administration, pushed forward by the Bush administration, and brought to completion by the Clinton administration, by the passage of NAFTA and then the Uruguay Round of GATT. Neither Reagan nor Bush were terribly anxious to talk about neoliberalism while it was still a “work in progress”. Reagan relied heavily on theatrics and distractions (i.e. blowing out of proportion issues such as abortion and church-state relations). Bush, on the other hand, relied on secrecy (the stealth presidency) and later on military triumphalism (the Gulf War and the glorification of the U.S. army). It was left to Clinton, to openly and directly adopt neoliberalism as one the leading policies of his administration.

Was it the Reagan administration then that established the atmosphere of “free market fundamentalism”, that so pervades (and obstructs) discussion of global economic and social problems? The answer is “not entirely”. Part of this atmosphere was created by the collapse of the Communist block in the early 90′s. For example, in 1985, Grosvenor International Publishers, published a three volume set of books on North/South commercial relations called Third World Development “edited” by Ronald Reagan. In it, several members of the Reagan cabinet wrote articles stressing the importance of agrarian reform. In 1991, in contrast, the World Bank Development Report devoted one sentence to agrarian reform, saying that it might be helpful to economic development in some instances.

The Third World

The Third World today is a different universe from the Third World in 1950. Most of the increase in human population has occurred since 1950, and most of that in the Third World.

In addition:

“From 1950 to 1985, the overall GDP of the Third World has increased some six times and per capital GDP 2.5 times..It’s industrial output is now 11 times higher than in 1950…Annual real gross capital formation is now 15 times higher. …Enrollment in higher education has risen nearly 25 fold. …Infant mortality rates fell from 200 per thousand to between 30 and 70… Life expectancy rose from below 40 years to about 65…The share of agricultural output in GDP has fallen from about 1/3 to 1/6 and the share of industry has risen from about 1/6 to 1/3. …Annual rates of the growth in the Third World sustained from 1950…were 5.5. percent for GDP, 7.5 percent for industrial output, 8.4 percent for capital formation and 10 percent for third level education.” (From Technological Transformation in The Third World, by Surendra J. Patel, Avebury Press, 1991).

In fact, the Third World is where post-1950 world history was made, the de-colonization, the demographic explosion, the violent Western crusade against “Red revolution”, including death squads, napalm, cluster bombs, the mass deaths and upheavals, the military capitalist defeats and the overwhelming technological, economic and cultural capitalist triumphs (the green revolution, the spread of “neoliberal” democratization and privatizations)

What about the changes in the “first” world since 1950? Well, the advances in basic science, particularly in biology and astronomy have been spectacular, unimaginable even in the science fiction of 1950. And yet none of these advances has had the growth inducing impact of a steam engine, an internal combustion engine, electricity, etc. The really significant commercial technological advances in the post war era have been the digital computer (1944), the transistor (1948) and the integrated circuit (1971). In the financial and service sectors of the economy these technologies have indeed produced economic growth (just ask Newt Gingrich). However, their primary impact has been to facilitate the spread of industrialism from the first to the Third World by means of better communication and the use of robotization in the “de-skilling” of industrial production. They have been technologies of “globalization” rather than technologies of post-war “American dream” style economic growth.

So we are now in a position to state the basic problem afflicting the American economy. The problem, in short, is, despite the spectacular advances in basic science and digital technology, the growth inducing technologies that propelled America’s “Golden Age” post-war growth have played themselves out (and have, in many cases, been too environmentally destructive). This (and not some nefarious alliance between “first” world plutocrats and “Third World elites”) is the problem, a problem which began in 1965…..

America’s Economic Problems, What Went Wrong Since 1965

In his article, “Soviet Economic Growth: 1928 – 1985″, in The Journal of Economic Literature, (Vol XXV, 1987) the economist Gur Ofer made a very interesting series of observations. From 1945 to 1965, both the Western and Soviet economies grew rapidly. In fact, prior to 1965, the Soviet economy outperformed the Western countries (and was looked upon by many Third World countries as the model to follow). Clearly, 1965 was a pivotal year both for the West and the Soviet Union. It was the year in which both blocs began to experience a “crisis of stagnation”. Could it be, asked Prof. Ofer, that some common factor was operating both in the West and in the Soviet Union, something that had nothing to do with capitalism, nothing to do with socialism, and nothing to do with globalization? In his article “What We Can Learn From The Soviet Collapse”, in Finance and Development (IMF, November, 1995) , the economist Stanley Fischer offered a guess. He postulated that, by the mid-sixties, the growth inducing technologies that been developed prior to and during World War II (automobilization, capital intensive agriculture, petrochemicals, civilian air transport, etc.) had partially played themselves out both in the West and in the Soviet Union. Prior to 1965, the Soviet Union grew more rapidly than the West because it had a greater number of primitive areas in its economy to which it could apply the range of technologies mentioned above. After 1965, on the other hand, the West grew more rapidly,. because it had a greater range of growth inducing technologies (particularly in the areas of digitalization, computerization and communication), and also because it had more commercial links to the developing countries, which were beginning to reap the effects of the green revolution, containerization and robotization (which allowed “industrialization without infrastructure”). This growth, while environmentally destructive and detrimental to many of the world’s poor, nonetheless stimulated Western economic growth, and made the Western “crisis of stagnation” much less severe than it otherwise would have been. Thus, while the West went on to slower growth (very unevenly distributed across sectors), greater income inequality, and all the headaches of globalization, the Soviet Union went on to complete economic collapse.

To explain the above in more detail, let us examine the standard theory of economic growth devised by Robert Solow in 1954. (See Growth Theory, An Exposition, by Robert Solow, Oxford University Press, 1969). According to this theory of growth (barring a massive population increase in the developed world), there are two sources of economic growth: (1) The spread of investment capital to areas of the world which don’t have it (globalization), (2) Technological innovations which allow the same amount of capital and labor to produce more output and a rising standard of living (“the American Dream”). It is the second type of economic growth which burgeoned from 1945 to 1965, and the first type which has become more and more prevalent since then. However, and this is a very important point, (2) did not slow down because (1) speeded up. In fact, (2) slowed down less than it would have, had (1) not speeded up.

Looking toward the future, there is always the possibility, of course, that some radically new technology will materialize which could produce rapid economic growth and a rising standard of living in the West, even in the absence of a massive population growth in the West. Everybody could see, for example, how “cold fusion” in 1989 could have achieved such a result. (This is why so many Americans wanted to believe it, and why it was accepted by so many people on the flimsiest of evidence). Barring such a development, however, what is “on the agenda” for the world economy is the spread of industrialization from the developed world to the underdeveloped world. Such a spread is not the cause of America’s problems. It is, if properly managed, the only solution to them.

In other words, given that the world economy is shifting from a phase of Western-led growth to a phase of Third World-led growth, the solution to America’s economic problems is the promotion of environmentally friendly, sustainable growth in the Third World, which, in turn, will generate widespread, long-term growth and employment in the West, which, in turn, will provide the tax base to solve America’s budget and social problems. Make no mistake about it, the growth patterns which have taken place in the Third World recently, environmentally destructive, unsustainable, inequitable and misguided as they have been, have, nonetheless, produced seven years of non-inflationary growth in the U.S., a growth which benefitted the vast majority of Americans (however unequally) Conversely, looking toward the future, if the Third World economies were to go into a deep, protracted slump, they would inevitably drag down the U.S. economy with them.

The Third World economist, Samir Amin, in his 1989 book, Maldevelopment, A Study of A Global Failure, Zed Press, gives the solution to this dilemma.

“For more than 15 years the world economic system has been in an enduring structural crisis. This is a world crisis marked by the collapse of growth in productive investment, a notable fall in profitability (very unequally distributed in sectors and companies) and persistent disorder in international relations…. The current crisis is therefore most apparent in the field of world relations. North/South relations and the conflicts around them constitute the central axis of the current crisis…… In..circumstances (such as the 1930′s) the Keynesian policies of redistribution of income might have been a solution to the crisis. By contrast, (the present crisis) comes after a long period of full employment, the rule of the welfare state, etc. Today’s deficient demand is essentially deficient demand in the periphery ……. In other words, only a redistribution at the international level in favor of the South would permit a fresh start for the world. The obvious question is ‘under whose aegis’ will …this be carried out?”

The recent NAFTA and GATT agreements answer this question. Under the aegis of private capital and under the aegis of the United States and its “instruments”, the IMF and the World Bank. (Wrong answer!) The NAFTA/GATT approach to global development is known as “neoliberalism”.

To over simplify enormously, the rationale behind the neoliberal model of development is as follows: the scale of economic production has grown so large that it has transcended national boundaries, it has even transcended the boundaries of large countries such as the United States and Japan. To subject such an economy to national restrictions on the flow of commodities and capital is like trying to raise cattle in one’s living room. There’s not enough room. Therefore, countries should not restrict the flow of commodities and capital across their borders. Moreover, if nations agree to reduce interference with the flow of commodity and capital to a minimum, capital will flow from capital surplus countries to capital deficient countries in the same way that water flows from a higher level to a lower level, and economic development will spread across the globe. Samir Amin has called this approach to global development “reactionary utopianism”.

This “reactionary utopianism” came into being partly as a result of the last 25 years of deliberate U.S. government policy, partly as a result as a result of the collapse of the socialist bloc, partly as a result of changes in technology, and partly as a result of the horrors of Cambodia’s and North Korea’s attempt to promote total economic self-sufficiency

The Role of The Transnational Corporations.

It has become the conventional wisdom among many environmentalists that there has been some takeover of Western national governments by multinationals following the dictates of the World Trade Organization. In fact, many of the top executives of multinationals are far more progressive in their personal views than are national politicians, and far more aware of the difficulties in basing everything on free markets and private capital placements.

The 1996 cuts in U.S. social entitlements and global economics

MIT economist Paul Krugman points out that “economic globalization” (neoliberalism) does not require the U.S. to cut the social safety net, in order to remain competitive internationally. It is important to stress this point. Yet, the cutbacks in social entitlements such as Medicaid and welfare are not entirely unrelated to neoliberalism. Here is what happened. After the passage of NAFTA, in 1993, Mexico with U.S. connivance, kept the Peso artificially high to suck in U.S. exports and to enable Clinton to show how beneficial NAFTA-type agreements were to the U.S. trade deficit. After GATT was passed, Mexico attempted to lower the Peso, a policy which started a massive flight of capital from Mexico. The Clinton administration responded with an emergency bailout in early 1995. At this point, global investors became aware that much of the world’s economy had become “dollarized”, that many of the private capital placements were being made in dollars. There was a perception that the Federal Reserve could not possibly act to reduce the supply of dollars in global circulation (in order to raise the value of the dollar relative to the yen), without, at the same time, risking a massive capital flight from the Third World. Thus, there was a “flight from the dollar” into the Japanese yen. The dollar dropped precipitously. Such a drop did not hurt the U.S. economy, because a large part of the Fed’s huge output of dollars was being used to finance Third World manufacturing capacity, which, in turn, was flooding the U.S. market with cheap products and keeping inflation in check.

Meanwhile, the low dollar was benefitting U.S. exports. Japan, on the other hand, was being pushed to the brink of a financial “meltdown”. Japan had trillions of dollars in outstanding yen debt. The drop in the dollar was increasing the “real value” of Japan’s debt daily and pushing Japan into a deflation. The U.S. obviously could not let the Japanese financial system go into a tailspin. The dollar had to be brought up, but not by monetary tightening. The only way to accomplish this was by implementing Republican-style budget cuts, but avoiding Republican style tax cuts. Clinton simply had to reach budget agreements with the Republicans in Congress, many of whom were determined to “wage class warfare from the top down”, and many of whom were simply ignorant about global financial problems, and, thus, in a far better position to “play chicken”. The upshot? Republicans lost their massive tax cuts, but got their welfare cuts. Clinton, whatever his feelings on entitlements and welfare, simply had no choice. A different Congress would have reached a different resolution to the budget crisis, globalization or no globalization. Thus, globalization is not an excuse for supporters of the social safety net to “throw in the towel”.

Four fifths of the world’s population lives in the Third World. Thus, sustainable (ecological) economic growth to address basic and mounting social needs simply cannot be avoided. It is imperative to develop a global alternative to neoliberalism. In a paper presented at the alternative summit “T.O.E.S. 1990,” we outlined some elements of this alternative. Working alternatives at the local level are very good, but some discussion must be devoted to how well these alternatives will “scale up”.

Economic growth is simply an increase in the volume and/ or size of economic transactions, as measured in monetary terms adjusted for inflation. There are billions of people in the world. Their educational and psychological problems cannot be addressed without first addressing their basic material needs (i.e. access to clean water, health care, adequate diet, shelter, etc.). Neoliberalism is only a stop-gap measure to the recent dilemmas of the world economic system — primarily Third World debt which in the 1980′s threatened the world financial system, and the lack of growth in Western capitalist countries). However, many corporate leaders, World Bank officials and the U.S. administrations, from Reagan to Clinton, know that it ultimately cannot work as a long-term global development strategy..

On the other hand, the no-growth” perspective of environmentalists will only continue to marginalize and isolate them from public economic debates, preventing them from addressing social issues such as “corporate downsizing” and “unemployment” — the results of economic stagnation in the U.S. and other advanced industrialized nations. Addressing the material and social needs of people North and South is inevitably going to involve an i ncrease in the number and/ or size of economic transactions, i.e. economic growth. Thus, “steady state economics” is a term borrowed from natural systems, and doesn’t, in our opinion, really apply to human historical and social development.

Economic Growth and Sustainable Development

The definition of “sustainable development”, by its very nature, has to be open-ended. The current mode of global economic growth (neoliberalism) shows us what sustainable development is not. Neoliberalism has clearly led to the rapid growth in industrial capacity and the rapid expansions of the middle class populations in many parts of the Third World, particularly in Asia. It has led to a considerable amount of environmental investment, albeit of the “clean up after the fact’ nature, in many parts of the Third World. However, it is still “economic growth for the hundreds of millions”, whereas the world’s population numbers in the billions. Environmentally and economically sustainable development requires a basic change in production methods and not simply “cleaning up after the fact.”

Several things, in our view, can be said about sustainable development. First of all, it has to involve the material betterment of the majority of the world’s population, not simply a numerically large minority. It has to involve non-market means to eliminate global poverty directly and not simply “global trickle down economics” . It has to involve production technologies which are themselves nonpolluting and not simply clean-up after the fact. It has to involve, reforestation, non-polluting solar energy, environmentally viable modernization of subsistence agriculture, rural and urban land reform, and large scale recycling of effluent and waste products. In our opinion, it will turn out to be most economically viable, precisely in those areas of the world that are now the least developed and, thus, not locked into the infrastructures of non-sustainable development. It will have to involve non-private global monetary/fiscal institutions which are accountable and globally democratic.

Anti-Third World Populist Hostility in The West

The problems of global development will not be resolved simply by having rich countries impose environmental, social and human rights conditions on the exports of poor countries. There is simply too much populist anti-Third World hostility in the rich countries. Many Americans, in particular, see the populations of the Third World as a mass of starving wretches who want to “take what we have”, either by violence, such as terrorism, or by unfair, predatory trade practices. To take an example, in early 1993, the historian Paul Kennedy published a book entitled Preparing for the 21th Century. The major premise of the book was that if the West did not help the Third World achieve sustainable development, the West itself would be overwhelmed by the Third World’s problems. In response to this appeal, Robert Kaplan wrote an article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled “The Coming Anarchy”, in which he predicted the social, economic and environmental collapse of the Third World, but asserted that the West could protect itself from this collapse by adopting the “fortress strategy” suggested by the right-wing Israeli military analyst, Martin Van Creveldt. .

Unfortunately, Mr. Kaplan’s scenarios of collapse and chaos in large parts of the non-Western world cannot entirely be ruled out. However, his predictions that such catastrophes will not endanger the West are, not only crazy, but actually dangerous. Why? Because there are all too many Americans who, equally threatened by Third World poverty and Third World prosperity (non-whites with money), would love to see the entire Third World collapse into Rwandan-style chaos. Mr. Kaplan ( like the American isolationists in the 30′s) assures them that they will not be personally endangered by such a catastrophe…

Therefore, decisions which put environmental, human and labor rights into trade agreements cannot possibly be left to the dictates of the populations of the developed world. International, democratic, and globally democratic, economic and financial institutions are an absolute necessity to any rational discussion of human rights, labor rights, social rights, environmental issues and economic justice

Misguided Attempts to Circumvent Anti-Third World Populism.

Early in 1983, Reagan’s secretary of agriculture, Bill Brock, said, “There’s a lot of Third World out there, and we are just beginning to discover how important it is to our own well being.” The Reagan administration, while it agreed privately with this insight, was not terribly anxious to share it with the American public, ( which was still in a Third World bashing mood after the oil price hikes and Iranian hostage taking of the late 70′s.)

During the Reagan and Bush period, therefore, Americans were given the impression that, aside from oil, the developing world was sort of “marginal” to American well being. It was assumed that the “rich man’s club” (America, Europe and Japan) was the global “engine of growth”, which could, in turn, “pull up” the non-Western world. The non-Western world, for its part, had to “behave itself”, open its markets, privatize its economy, welcome Western capital investments, tone down its “Third World rhetoric” and make nice with Israel. And, if it didn’t, well then, who cared, “we” didn’t need “them” anyway.

In 1990, however (fearful of competition from a newly capitalist Eastern-bloc), the Third World began to “behave itself”. At that point, the official American line on the Third World, did a complete about-face. The Third World went from being a “problem”, a “mess”, a “threat”, a “side issue”, to being “the future”, to being an unstoppable locomotive of economic growth that the U.S. had to board or be left behind. Clinton “talked up” Third World growth and played down problems and barriers to Third World development. An officially sanctioned “love affair” began between international capital and large sectors of the developing world, a love affair between the strong and the weak, fraught with anxiety and abuse. As an Argentinian director of tourism, Hector Sabato, put it. “The old theme of the invading Yankees gave way to the wonderful Yankees driving the global train that you’d better board immediately or your finished.” (NYT 2/7/98). Or as William Greider (author of One World Ready or Not) put it, even many of the exploited in the developing world were “seduced’ by the “faustian bargain” of capitalist development through globalization.

In any case, the “child” of this love affair is the current international political and economic crisis, in which much of the world economy is turned into a giant “global distress sale”, the proceeds of which go to finance America’s own rapid economic growth.

A Twenty Six Year History of Global “Quick Fixes”

To review the above history in more detail, American global economic policy from 1982 to the present can be divided into three periods; (1) a period of debt-led growth from 1982 to 1985, in which the U.S. deliberately ran large trade and budget deficits in order to stabilize the world economy by becoming what David Hale of Kemper Financial Services called “a consumer and borrower of last resort”; (2) a period from 1985 to 1990, in which the U.S. pressured other industrialized countries to liberalize their financial systems and stimulate their economies in order to help the U.S. work off the trade deficit caused by the first period above. This period ended with a Japanese financial collapse and a deep European recession. (3)The period from 1991 characterized by the US promotion of the neoliberal model of growth in which the developing world underwent a rapid process of financial liberalization and economic privatization, attracting large amounts of private capital, enabling it to become a growing market for American exports even as it kept American inflation down by low-wage exports to the American economy. This period produced seven years of non-inflationary growth for the US economy which allowed it to work down its trade and budget deficits (at everyone else’s expense).

More precisely, from 1985 to the present, the US has been imposing a series of unsustainable economic and financial bubbles on various regions of the world successively (first Japan and Europe, then Asia, then Latin America, then China, etc.) in order to satisfy its insatiable demand for exports. Countries and regions have been overwhelmed by floods of outside capital, which they had neither the social nor economic institutions to deal with. A more viable policy would be the promotion of economic growth in more areas of the world simultaneously, but at a slower and more sustainable pace. Africa and the Arab world should not be written off as “basket cases” to be left to the dictates of a fickle global financial market.

As of this writing, policy makers are urging Japan to become the “locomotive” for Asia. Poor people in Asia are being asked to reduce their consumption, even as rich people in Japan are being asked to increase theirs. It seems that we’re back to ”Western-led growth” again. However, the only real “locomotive” for global and American economic growth, the only “locomotive” that doesn’t turn out to be a “bubble” is the alleviation of Third World poverty and the promotion of Third World sustainable development.

Advice to Policy Makers

Therefore, it is extremely important for progressives, such as yourself, whose “heart is in the right place”, to articulate the following points loudly and clearly:

●          Successful Third World development is vital not only to the economic well being, but also to the national security of America;

●          Insertion of environmental, labor and human rights conditions into trade agreements has to be accompanied by direct, massive Western assistance to eliminate global poverty. A transfer of wealth from “Third World elites” to “Third World masses” (however necessary) is, by itself, not going to do the job;

●          Western assistance is a necessity, but is, by no means, sufficient. It also has to be accompanied by Third World reforms at both the national and local levels. Thus, the future well being of the Western populations is not entirely in the hands of the West;

●          The “right to development and subsistence” is also a basic human right, in addition to the rights of free speech, gender equality, etc.;

Conclusions

An American egalitarianism, which stops at the water’s edge, is as meaningless as it is regressive. Statements such as “we must solve our problems, before we solve their problems”, or “we must solve problems here, before solving them there” are childish nonsense. In today’s world, everyone is “we”, and everywhere is ‘here”.

The belief that “de-globalization” and return to “national economies” will solve our economic problems, and be “good for the Third World too”, is pious wishful thinking.

Here are some of the arguments supporting this “pious wishful thinking”: The nearer production decisions are made to local communities, the more the needs of local consumers, workers and natural environment are taken into account. Decisions taken by investors in distant capitals cannot possibly serve the needs of the people in local communities.. Local production and investment mean local accountability, “local capital is good, global capital is bad” and, so on and so forth.

The problem with these arguments is this: It would take the power of a “global government” to turn “global capital” into “local capital”. Why? Because cross border flows of capital and goods would have to be continuously and minutely monitored and suppressed, and such activities could only be carried out by a global government .

Now, observe how difficult it is to do such things with illegal drugs and illegal drug capital. Imagine how difficult it would be to do them with all goods and all capital. It would take the powers of an immensely powerful world government. Peoples lives would no longer be determined by distant global corporations, but by distant global bureaucracies, and the problems of globalization would remain. And if global capital were to be abolished by a massive breakdown in the global capitalist system, as in the 1914-1945 period, well then look at what happened in the 1914 – 1945 period, and imagine what would happen now.

All too much of the debate about trade policy on the part of liberals and labor seems to reflect a desire to “make the rest of the world go away”. However, the problems of the rest of the world have to be solved, if America’s problems are to be solved, and this is going to require (among other things) global markets, global business, and (yes) global regulation and governance (including global fiscal stimulus and global North-South redistribution). To be sure, global solutions risk global screw-ups, markets can crash, markets can breach global environmental limits, markets are unfair. Governments, on the other hand, can oppress, they can ossify, they can make mistakes (and global governments can make them on a global scale), they can become ineffectual, they lack “feed back” mechanisms, and so on.

But the fact is that human beings, who are, after all, not social insects and thus have no instinct for collective organization, have nonetheless organized themselves into ever more complex, and ever more populous societies, at an ever increasing rate. The nature of this organization, the way it takes place, is very complicated, very convoluted, and ultimately very mysterious. It is certainly not any of that “elaborate, self-adaptive complexity arising from simple market laws” nonsense you might read about in some business magazine or other. It is, in fact, the central dilemma of human existence, a dilemma which is not about to go away now. And the world’s problems, if they are solved at all, are not going to be solved by making them out to be simpler than they are.

It is imperative that progressives and labor frame global alternatives to neoliberalism, global alternatives which stress the needs of the world’s poor. Otherwise, when neoliberalism really gets into trouble, as it will, the field will be left open to right wing extremists of all types; paramilitary groups, white separatists, right wing religious zealots, neo-fascists, hate-mongers like David Duke and chaos-mongers like Robert Kaplan. At that point, the stability of the United States itself might be thrown into question.

It might seem paradoxical that those Americans who are themselves struggling to make a living should be called upon to advance the cause of global North-South equity, sustainable development, and global poverty alleviation. But if they don’t do it, then who will? Rich business executives? Academics with cushy tenured positions? Employees of prestigious well-heeled foundations? Such people, no matter how knowledgeable they are, are too comfortable and complacent to understand the main problem with the world economy (global poverty). People on top can rarely diagnose adequately the flaws of a system which put them on top. As economist Albert Fishlow says, “the old rules (of the global capitalist system) don’t work and the new ones haven’t been written yet.” (New York Times, 1/15/98). It’s up to progressives in all countries to write those rules after the ball is taken away from the blind and destructive neoliberals and neoconservatives.. .

L. Feiner and R. Melson

NOTES

MORE:

Feb 7, 2008 … CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP.

BOOK: ‘World Economy/Big Prediction’.

(Kappa Publishing. Kobunsha, Tokyo, from 1984)

http://cambridgeforecast.org/blog2/2008/02/07/cambridge-forecast-group-book-world-economy/

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP: OVERVIEW

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP

Analyzing globalization, the Middle East & the world-system

CFG Intro

About CFG

CFG Today

CFG Tomorrow

Home

Middle East

Globalization

Economic Data

Background Essays

Blogs

The West & the Third World

Muslims & Jews in the World-System

Economic & Corporate Data

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP

CAMBRIDGE FORECAST GROUP: WORLD ECONOMY BIG

PREDICTION BOOK

Unsustainable Patterns of World Economic Growth

FINANCIAL BUBBLES AND UNSUSTAINABLE PATTERNS OF WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH

Globalization The Middle East and The World-System:

GLOBALIZATION AS A TRAFFIC JAM OF THREE

SUBWORLDS

GLOBALIZATION DEEP STRUCTURE

GLOBALIZATION AS THREE GEARS

Analyzing globalization, the Middle East & the world-system

GLOBAL ECONOMY: BIS JULY 2012

Central bankers’ speeches for 19 and 20 July now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 7/20/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 20 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Már Guðmundsson: Fragmentation in the international financial system – can the global economy become one again?

Duvvuri Subbarao: Of economics, policy and development

Anand Sinha: Small is still beautiful and competitive – reflections on the growth of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in India

Ignazio Visco: Brief overview of the Italian economy and its banks

Central bankers’ speeches for 19 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Financial crises and the future of global and Asian banking

G Padmanabhan: Issues in IT governance

Mark Carney: Summary of the latest Monetary Policy Report

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 18 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Jens Weidmann: The financial assistance can only buy time but does not address the root causes of the crisis

Ben S Bernanke: Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress

G Padmanabhan: Global convergence of banking regulations and its impact on the Indian banking system

G Padmanabhan: Getting “IT” right

Duvvuri Subbarao: Statistics and statistical analysis in Reserve Bank of India’s work

Deepak Mohanty: Statistics in the Reserve Bank of India

V S Das: Leadership, performance and transformation through personnel management

Njuguna Ndung’u: Ongoing developments in the Kenyan financial sector

Njuguna Ndung’u: Financal services sector – steering the economy to the next level

Yaseen Anwar: Monetary policy framework in the SAARC region

Anselmo Teng: Development opportunity arising from cross-border RMB business and internationalization of enterprises

Gane Simbe: The role coins play in the Solomon Islands’ payment system

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Economic and financial cooperation between China and Thailand

Ebson Uanguta: The impact of the euro area debt crisis on southern Africa

Ebson Uanguta: Towards a financially literate Namibian society

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Participation of Japanese financial institutions in Malaysia

Jörg Asmussen: Building deeper economic union: what to do and what to avoid

Luis M Linde: Assessment of Spain’s economic situation

Yaseen Anwar: Developments of the microfinance sector in Pakistan

Central bankers’ speeches for 17 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Már Guðmundsson: Iceland’s crisis and recovery and the crisis in the eurozone

Arde Hansen: Overview of Bank of Estonia’s first year of the euro

Zeljko Rohatinski: Restoring the luster of the European economic model report

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 13 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Duvvuri Subbarao: Agricultural credit – accomplishments and challenges

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Ivan Iskrov: Association of Banks in Bulgaria – 20 years

Dimiter Kostov: The world of finance is becoming more IT

Ivan Iskrov: Global and regional challenges to the economy and the financial system. Do we have working solutions?

Ivan Iskrov: Conflicts and complementarities between monetary and macroprudential policies

Subir Gokarn: Launch of the OTC derivatives trade repository

Philip Lowe: Bank regulation and the future of banking

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 11 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Financing the Greater Mekong Subregion

Ardian Fullani: Building a sound and efficient Albanian banking system

Duvvuri Subbarao: Touching hearts and spreading smiles

Hirohide Yamaguchi: European debt problem and its impact on Asia

Central bankers’ speeches for 10 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Financial crises and the future of global and Asian banking

Choongsoo Kim: Monetary and macroprudential policies in the aftermath of the crisis

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 5 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s recent economic and financial developments

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Ensuring strong anchors in our banking system

Central bankers’ speeches for 4 July 2012
now available on the BIS website

YV Reddy: Society, economic policies, and the financial sector

José de Gregorio: What does society expect from the financial sector?

Ignazio Visco: What does society expect from the financial sector?

Jörg Asmussen: Can we restore confidence in Europe?

Miroslav Singer: The role of creditors and debtors in the world economy

Anand Sinha: IT and governance in banks – some thoughts

Mugur Isărescu: Monetary policy during transition. How to manage paradigm shifts

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

NEW CFG YOUTUBE TALK JULY 2012: FEINER ON PAST AND FUTURE

“long term global econo-history with implications for

the future”

(part 1)

Click On:

VID00008.AVILawrence Feiner 07-04-12

Lawrence Feiner CFG

Play video

Added on 7/05/12

zoiladejesus27 uploaded

CURRENT CRISIS: BIS JUNE 12 2012

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June now available

(including 4 additional speeches)‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 6/12/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

Norman T L Chan: Hong Kong as a private banking hub – a regulator’s vision

Ignazio Visco: Economic and policy interconnections in the current crisis

Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile: Bank of Uganda highlights its Board’s achievements

Lawrence Williams: Leveraging central banks’ IT investments for strategic advantage

Choongsoo Kim: Emerging Asia and global economic recovery

Choongsoo Kim: Asia’s role in reviving global growth and financial stability

Choongsoo Kim: Returning to sustainable growth – an EME’s perspective

Lars E O Svensson: Differing views on monetary policy

Erdem Başçi: Financial and macroeconomic stability

Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile: Expanding financial access and financial inclusion in Uganda

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June now available

(including 4 additional speeches)‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 6/12/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 6/12/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

Choongsoo Kim: Emerging Asia and global economic recovery

Choongsoo Kim: Asia’s role in reviving global growth and financial stability

Choongsoo Kim: Returning to sustainable growth – an EME’s perspective

Lars E O Svensson: Differing views on monetary policy

Erdem Başçi: Financial and macroeconomic stability

Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile: Expanding financial access and financial inclusion in Uganda

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 12 June now available‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 6/12/12

ISLAMIC FINANCE AND THE GLOBAL FUTURE: BIS JUNE 1-8

Central bankers’ speeches from 6 to 8 June now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 6/08/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 8 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

Fahad Bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak:

Combatting money laundering and terrorism financing

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Developments in Spain

Masaaki Shirakawa: Japan’s economy and monetary policy

Ben S Bernanke: Economic outlook and policy

Glenn Stevens: The glass half full

Central bankers’ speeches for 7 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement

Ravi Menon: The next phase in Islamic finance

Janet L Yellen: Perspectives on monetary policy

Ardian Fullani: Recent economic and monetary developments in Albania

Daniel K Tarullo: Dodd-Frank Act implementation

Central bankers’ speeches for 6 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

K C Chakrabarty: Human Resource management in banks – need for a new perspective

K C Chakrabarty: Exploring the challenge of financial education across emerging economies

Jörg Asmussen: Lessons from Latvia and the Baltics

Richard W Fisher: The limits of the powers of central banks

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches from 6 to 8 June now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 6/08/12

Central bankers’ speeches from 6 to 8 June now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 6/01/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 1 June 2012
now available on the BIS website

Lawrence Williams: An evolving financial services landscape in the Caribbean

Ignazio Visco: Overview of economic and financial developments in Italy

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches from 6 to 8 June now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 6/08/12

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS MAY 31 2012: GREAT RECESSION

Central bankers’ speeches for 31 May now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Thu 5/31/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 31 May 2012
now available on the BIS website

Masaaki Shirakawa: Demographic changes and macroeconomic performance – Japanese experiences

William C Dudley: Job polarization in the region

Erkki Liikanen: The great recession and its long shadow – youth unemployment

Choongsoo Kim: Out of the Great Recession – an EME’s perspective

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Monetary policy is not almighty

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 31 May now available‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Thu 5/31/12

REVIEW OF CFG BOOK: “REAGAN REVOLUTION…”

“The Reagan Revolution and the Developing Countries (1980-1990):

A Seminal Decade for Predicting the World Economic Future”

Lawrence Feiner and Richard Melson

iUniverse, 353 pages, (paperback) $23.94, 978-1-4620-6189-1

(Reviewed: May, 2012)

Lawrence Feiner and Richard Melson, both former principals of the Cambridge Forecast Group, have written a sharp challenge to prevailing economic thought.

The authors argue that despite the chaos that seems to have enveloped the world economy since the end of the Cold War (as typified in the writings of Francis Fukuyama, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan), the direction and development of world economic history is, in fact, quite predictable.

Proponents of controversial “New Growth Theories,” Feiner and Melson argue that human capital and knowledge are quantifiable variables that, using mathematical formulae, can be both identified and extrapolated to the future. Once identified, an economic future can be reasonably predicted. Their work leads them to conclude that a post-Cold War economic world will revolve around a rapid shifting of economic priorities, emphasizing the needs and contributions of the developing world.

This is decidedly not a book for beginners in economics. It is a dense, detailed read, full of equations; readers should take the authors seriously with their oft-repeated asides that knowledge of basic calculus will enhance a person’s ability to understand the book. Specialists will, to be sure, find the book’s argument thought provoking. But they are likely to be frustrated by the authors’ use of several competing styles of citation and the absence of a list of the works cited or bibliography to help the reader translate the citations. Both specialist and generalist alike will also be distracted by the number of typographical errors. (One must pause when reading a book on economics that misspells the name of Milton Friedman.)

Decidedly not a book on the Reagan Revolution (which receives only a few pages here), this book does dare the economic specialist to think outside the box, and to consider a theory that might well explain where the world economy is heading. For that, this provocative book has merit.

BlueInk Heads Up: Despite the typographical flaws, professional economists and professors of economics will find this book both appealing and important.

The Reagan Revolution and the Developing Countries (1980-1990):

A Seminal Decade for Predicting the World Economic Future

Lawrence Feiner and Richard Melson
iUniverse, 353 pages, (paperback) $23.94, 978-1-4620-6189-1

(Reviewed: May, 2012)

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS MAY 29 2012: FRENCH CONSUMERS

Central bankers’ speeches for 29 May now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 5/29/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 29 May 2012
now available on the BIS website

Christian Noyer: Challenges facing France’s Prudential Supervisory Authority

Glenn Stevens: Innovation, stability and the role of the Payments System Board

Christian Noyer: France’s Prudential Supervisory Authority and Financial Markets Authority – enhancing the protection of French consumers

Dimitar Bogov: Republic of Macedonia – celebrating monetary independence

Dimitar Bogov: Creating an environment for sustainable economic growth in Macedonia

Dimitar Bogov: Challenges of countries from South-Eastern Europe in the current economic and financial turbulence in the euro area

Dimitar Bogov: Promoting Macedonia’s cultural and historical values

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 29 May now available‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Tue 5/29/12

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS MAY 24-25 2012: PENSION FUNDS

Central bankers’ speeches for 24 and 25 May now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 5/25/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 25 May 2012
now available on the BIS website

William C Dudley: Conducting monetary policy – rules, learning and risk management

Jörg Asmussen: A European agenda 20..

Jörg Asmussen: A European Central Bank perspective on key issues of the crisis

Mario Draghi: A route for Europe

Peter Praet: European financial integration in times of crisis

Central bankers’ speeches for 24 May 2012
now available on the BIS website

Bojan Marković: National Bank of Serbia’s outlook on inflation

Charles Bean: Pension funds and quantitative easing

Erkki Liikanen: Monetary policy in unconventional times

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 24 and 25 May now available‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Fri 5/25/12

INTERNAL REPO AND PROPRIETARY BET

Repurchase agreement

“Another controversial form of repurchase order is the “internal repo” which first came to prominence in 2005. In 2011 is was speculated, though not proven, that internal repos used to finance risky trades in sovereign European bonds may have been the mechanism by which MF Global lost some several hundred million dollars of client funds, prior to its bankruptcy in October 2011.^[7]”

A repurchase agreement, also known as a repo, RP, or sale and repurchase agreement, is the sale of securities together with an agreement for the seller to buy back the securities at a later date. The repurchase price should be greater than the original sale price, the difference effectively representing interest, sometimes called the repo rate. The party that originally buys the securities effectively acts as a lender. The original seller is effectively acting as a borrower, using their security as collateral for a secured cash loan at a fixed rate of interest.

A repo is equivalent to a spot sale combined with a forward contract. The spot sale results in transfer of money to the borrower in exchange for legal transfer of the security to the lender, while the forward contract ensures repayment of the loan to the lender and return of the collateral of the borrower. The difference between the forward price and the spot price is effectively the interest on the loan while the settlement date of the forward contract is the maturity date of the loan.

Structure and terminology

A repo is economically similar to a secured loan, with the buyer (effectively the lender or investor) receiving securities as collateral to protect him against default by the seller. The party who initially sells the securities is effectively the borrower. Almost any security may be employed in a repo, though highly liquid securities are preferred as they are more easily disposed of in the event of a default and, more importantly, they can be easily obtained in the open market where the buyer has created a short position in the repo security by a reverse repo and market sale; by the same token, non liquid securities are discouraged. Treasury or Government bills, corporate and Treasury/Government bonds, and stocks may all be used as “collateral” in a repo transaction. Unlike a secured loan, however, legal title to the securities passes from the seller to the buyer. Coupons (interest payable to the owner of the securities) falling due while the repo buyer owns the securities are, in fact, usually passed directly onto the repo seller. This might seem counterintuitive, as the legal ownership of the collateral rests with the buyer during the repo agreement. The agreement might instead provide that the buyer receives the coupon, with the cash payable on repurchase being adjusted to compensate, though this is more typical of sell/buybacks.

Although the transaction is similar to a loan, and its economic effect is similar to a loan, the terminology differs from that applying to loans: the seller legally repurchases the securities from the buyer at the end of the loan term. However a key aspect of repos is that they are legally recognised as a single transaction (important in the event of counterparty insolvency) and not as a disposal and a repurchase for tax purposes.

The following table summarizes the terminology:

Types of repo and related products

There are three types of repo maturities: overnight, term, and open repo. Overnight refers to a one-day maturity transaction. Term refers to a repo with a specified end date. Open simply has no end date. Although repos are typically short-term, it is not unusual to see repos with a maturity as long as two years.

Repo transactions occur in three forms: specified delivery, tri-party, and held in custody (wherein the “selling” party holds the security during the term of the repo). The third form (hold-in-custody) is quite rare, particularly in developing markets, primarily due to the risk that the seller will become insolvent prior to maturation of the repo and the buyer will be unable to recover the securities that were posted as collateral to secure the transaction. The first form—specified delivery—requires the delivery of a prespecified bond at the onset, and at maturity of the contractual period. Tri-party essentially is a basket form of transaction, and allows for a wider range of instruments in the basket or pool. In a tri-party repo transaction a third party clearing agent or bank is interposed between the “seller” and the “buyer” The third party maintains control of the securities that are the subject of the agreement and processes the payments from the “seller” to the “buyer.”

Due bill/hold in-custody repo

In a due bill repo, the collateral pledged by the (cash) borrower is not actually delivered to the cash lender. Rather, it is placed in an internal account (“held in custody”) by the borrower, for the lender, throughout the duration of the trade. This has become less common as the repo market has grown, particularly owing to the creation of centralized counterparties. Due to the high risk to the cash lender, these are generally only transacted with large, financially stable institutions.

Tri-party repo

The distinguishing feature of a tri-party repo is that a custodian bank or international clearing organization, the tri-party agent, acts as an intermediary between the two parties to the repo. The tri-party agent is responsible for the administration of the transaction including collateral allocation, marking to market, and substitution of collateral. In the US, the two principal tri-party agents are The Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase. The size of the US tri-party repo market peaked in 2008 before the worst effects of the crisis at approximately $2.8 trillion and by mid 2010 was about $1.6 trillion.^[1] As tri-party agents administer hundreds of billions of US$ of collateral, they have the scale to subscribe to multiple data feeds to maximise the universe of coverage. As part of a tri-party agreement the three parties to the agreement, the tri-party agent, the repo buyer and the repo seller agree to a collateral management service agreement which includes an “eligible collateral profile”. It is this “eligible collateral profile” that enables the repo buyer to define their risk appetite in respect of the collateral that they are prepared to hold against their cash. For example a more risk averse repo buyer may wish to only hold “on-the-run” government bonds as collateral. In the event of a liquidation event of the repo seller the collateral is highly liquid thus enabling the repo buyer to sell the collateral quickly. A less risk averse repo buyer may be prepared to take non investment grade bonds or equities as collateral, which may be less liquid and may suffer a higher price volatility in the event of a repo seller default, making it more difficult for the repo buyer to sell the collateral and recover their cash. The tri-party agents are able to offer sophisticated collateral eligibility filters which allow the repo buyer to create these “eligible collateral profiles” which can systemically generate collateral pools which reflect the buyer’s risk appetite.^[2] Collateral eligibility criteria could include asset type, issuer, currency, domicile, credit rating, maturity, index, issue size, average daily traded volume, etc. Both the lender (repo buyer) and borrower (repo seller) of cash enter into these transactions to avoid the administrative burden of bi-lateral repos. In addition, because the collateral is being held by an agent, counterparty risk is reduced. A tri-party repo may be seen as the outgrowth of the due bill repo, in which the collateral is held by a neutral third party.

Whole loan repo

A whole loan repo is a form of repo where the transaction is collateralized by a loan or other form of obligation (e.g. mortgage receivables) rather than a security.

Equity repo

The underlying security for many repo transactions is in the form of government or corporate bonds. Equity repos are simply repos on equity securities such as common (or ordinary) shares. Some complications can arise because of greater complexity in the tax rules for dividends as opposed to coupons.

Sell/buy backs and buy/sell backs

A sell/buy back is the spot sale and a forward repurchase of a security. It is two distinct outright cash market trades, one for forward settlement. The forward price is set relative to the spot price to yield a market rate of return. The basic motivation of sell/buy backs is generally the same as for a classic repo, i.e. attempting to benefit from the lower financing rates generally available for collateralized as opposed to non-secured borrowing. The economics of the transaction are also similar with the interest on the cash borrowed through the sell/buy back being implicit in the difference between the sale price and the purchase price.
There are a number of differences between the two structures. A repo is technically a single transaction whereas a sell/buy back is a pair of transactions (a sell and a buy). A sell/buy back does not require any special legal documentation while a repo generally requires a master agreement to be in place between the buyer and seller (typically the SIFMA/ICMA commissioned Global Master Repo Agreement (GMRA)). For this reason there is an associated increase in risk compared to repo. Should the counterparty default, the lack of agreement may lessen legal standing in retrieving collateral. Any coupon payment on the underlying security during the life of the sell/buy back will generally be passed back to the buyer of the security by adjusting the cash paid at the termination of the sell/buy back. In a repo, the coupon will be passed on immediately to the seller of the security.

A buy/sell back is the equivalent of a “reverse repo”.

Securities lending

In securities lending, the purpose is to temporarily obtain the security for other purposes, such as covering short positions or for use in complex financial structures. Securities are generally lent out for a fee and securities lending trades are governed by different types of legal agreements than repos.

Repos have traditionally been used as a form of collateralized loan and have been treated as such for tax purposes. Modern Repo agreements, however, often allow the cash lender to sell the security provided as collateral and substitute an equivalent security at repurchase.^[3] In this way the cash lender acts as a security borrower and the Repo agreement can be used to take a short position in the security very much like a security loan might be used.^[4]

Reverse Repo

A reverse repo is simply the same repurchase agreement from the buyer’s viewpoint, not the seller’s. Hence, the seller executing the transaction would describe it as a “repo”, while the buyer in the same transaction would describe it a “reverse repo”. So “repo” and “reverse repo” are exactly the same kind of transaction, just described from opposite viewpoints. The term “reverse repo and sale” is commonly used to describe the creation of a short position in a debt instrument where the buyer in the repo transaction immediately sells the security provided by the seller on the open market. On the settlement date of the repo, the buyer acquires the relevant security on the open market and delivers it to the seller. In such a short transaction the seller is wagering that the relevant security will decline in value between the date of the repo and the settlement date.

Uses

For the buyer, a repo is an opportunity to invest cash for a customized period of time (other investments typically limit tenures). It is short-term and safer as a secured investment since the investor receives collateral. Market liquidity for repos is good, and rates are competitive for investors. Money Funds are large buyers of Repurchase Agreements.

For traders in trading firms, repos are used to finance long positions, obtain access to cheaper funding costs of other speculative investments, and cover short positions in securities.

In addition to using repo as a funding vehicle, repo traders “make markets“. These traders have been traditionally known as “matched-book repo traders”. The concept of a matched-book trade follows closely to that of a broker who takes both sides of an active trade, essentially having no market risk, only credit risk. Elementary matched-book traders engage in both the repo and a reverse repo within a short period of time, capturing the profits from the bid/ask spread between the reverse repo and repo rates. Presently, matched-book repo traders employ other profit strategies, such as non-matched maturities, collateral swaps, and liquidity management.

United States Federal Reserve use of reposM/strong>

Repurchase agreements when transacted by the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve in open market operations adds reserves to the banking system and then after a specified period of time withdraws them; reverse repos initially drain reserves and later add them back. This tool can also be used to stabilize interest rates, and the Federal Reserve has used it to adjust the Federal funds rate to match the target rate.^[5]

Under a repurchase agreement (“RP” or “repo”), the Federal Reserve (Fed) buys U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. agency securities, or mortgage-backed securities from a primary dealer who agrees to buy them back, typically within one to seven days; a reverse repo is the opposite. Thus the Fed describes these transactions from the counterparty’s viewpoint rather than from their own viewpoint.

If the Federal Reserve is one of the transacting parties, the RP is called a “system repo”, but if they are trading on behalf of a customer (e.g. a foreign central bank) it is called a “customer repo”. Until 2003 the Fed did not use the term “reverse repo”—which it believed implied that it was borrowing money (counter to its charter)—but used the term “matched sale” instead.

Risks

While classic repos are generally credit-risk mitigated instruments, there are residual credit risks. Though it is essentially a collateralized transaction, the seller may fail to repurchase the securities sold, at the maturity date. In other words, the repo seller defaults on his obligation. Consequently, the buyer may keep the security, and liquidate the security in order to recover the cash lent. The security, however, may have lost value since the outset of the transaction as the security is subject to market movements. To mitigate this risk, repos often are over-collateralized as well as being subject to daily mark-to-market margining (i.e. if the collateral falls in value, a Margin call can be triggered asking the borrower to post extra securities). Conversely, if the value of the security rises there is a credit risk for the borrower in that the creditor may not sell them back. If this is considered to be a risk, then the borrower may negotiate a repo which is under-collateralized.^[6] Credit risk associated with repo is subject to many factors: term of repo, liquidity of security, the strength of the counterparties involved, etc.

Certain forms of Repo transactions came into focus within the financial press due to the technicalities of settlements following the collapse of Refco in 2005. Occasionally, a party involved in a repo transaction may not have a specific bond at the end of the repo contract. This may cause a string of failures from one party to the next, for as long as different parties have transacted for the same underlying instrument. The focus of the media attention centers on attempts to mitigate these failures.

In 2008, attention was drawn to a form of repo known as repo 105 following the Lehman collapse, as it was alleged that repo 105s had been used as an accounting trick to hide Lehman’s worsening financial health.

Another controversial form of repurchase order is the “internal repo” which first came to prominence in 2005. In 2011 is was speculated, though not proven, that internal repos used to finance risky trades in sovereign European bonds may have been the mechanism by which MF Global lost some several hundred million dollars of client funds, prior to its bankruptcy in October 2011.^[7]

History

In the US, Repos have been used from as early as 1917 when war time taxes made older forms of lending less attractive. At first Repos were used just by the Federal reserve to lend to other banks, but the practice soon spread to other market participants. The use of Repos expanded in the 1920s, fell away through the Great depression and WWII, then expanded once again in the 1950s, enjoying rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s in part due to computer technology.^[6]

In July 2011, concerns arose among bankers and the financial press that if the 2011 U.S. debt ceiling crisis leads to a default it could cause considerable disruption to the repo market. This is because treasuries are the most commonly used collateral within the US repo market, and as a default would downgrade the value of treasuries it could result in repo borrowers having to post far more collateral. ^[8]

Market size

The US Federal Reserve and the European Repo Council (a body of the International Capital Market Association) both try to estimate the size of their respective repo markets. At the end of 2004, the U.S. repo market reached US$5 trillion.

The European repo market has experienced consistent growth over the past five years, from €1.9 billion in 2001 to €6.4 trillion by the end of 2006, and is expected to continue significant growth due to Basel II, according to a 2007 Celent report entitled “The European Repo Market”.^[9]

Especially in the US and to a lesser degree in Europe, the repo market contracted in 2008 as a result of the financial crisis. But, by mid 2010, the market had largely recovered and at least in Europe had grown to exceed its pre-crisis peak.^[1]

Other countries including Chile, India, Japan, Mexico, Hungary, Russia, China, and Taiwan, have their own repo markets, though activity varies by country, and no global survey or report has been compiled.

Repo and Reverse Repo in India

In India, RBI uses repo and reverse repo techniques to increase or decrease the liquidity in the market. To increase liquidity, RBI buys government securities from banks under REPO; to decrease liquidity, RBI sells the government securities to banks. http://www.svtuition.org/2011/11/repo-and-reverse-repo.html

Notes and references

1. 1. ^{a b} Gillian Tett (2010-09-23). “Repo needs a backstop to avoid future crises”. The Financial Times. Retrieved 2010-09-24.
2. 2. In other words, if the lender seeks a high rate of return they can accept securities with a relatively high risk of falling in value and so enjoy a higher repo rate, whereas if they are risk adverse they can select securities which are expected to rise or at least not fall in value.
3. 3. http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/60f595c5-6bb2-4a4e-8fe2-5378a84cd91a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c4755b62-a153-47bc-b341-84e08001da31/Are%20Repos%20Really%20Loans.pdf
4. 4. http://www.primebrokerage.net/blog/tag/repo-rate/
5. 5. John Hussman. “Hardly a Bailout” Hussman Funds, August 13, 2007. Accessed September 3, 2010.
6. 6. ^{a b} Kenneth D. Garbade (2006-05-01). “The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s”. New York Fed. Retrieved 2010-09-24.
7. 7. AZAM AHMED and BEN PROTESS (2011-11-03). “As Regulators Pressed Changes, Corzine Pushed Back, and Won”. New York Times. Retrieved 2011-11-08.
8. 8. Darrell Duffie and Anil K Kashyap (2011-07-27). “US default would spell turmoil for the repo market”. The Financial Times. Retrieved 2011-07-29.
9. 9. Celent Report: According to figures published by Celent 6 June 2007.

links

• Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions – Fedpoints – Federal Reserve Bank of New York
• Explanation of the Federal Reserve repurchase agreements actions of August 10, 2007
• Statement Regarding Counterparties for Reverse Repurchase Agreements March 8, 2010

Proprietary trading

Proprietary trading (also “prop trading” or PPT) occurs when a firm trades stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, their derivatives, or other financial instruments, with the firm’s own money as opposed to its customers’ money, so as to make a profit for itself. They may use a variety of strategies such as index arbitrage, statistical arbitrage, merger arbitrage, fundamental analysis, volatility arbitrage or global macro trading, much like a hedge fund. Many reporters and analysts believe that large banks purposely leave ambiguous the amount of non-proprietary trading they do versus the amount of proprietary trading they do, because it is felt that proprietary trading is riskier and results in more volatile profits.

The relationships between trading and banking

Banks are companies that assist other companies in raising financial capital, transacting foreign currency exchange, and managing financial risks. Trading has almost always been associated with large banks, however, because they are often required to make a market to facilitate the services they provide (e.g. trading stocks, bonds, and loans in capital raising; trading currencies to help with international business transactions; and trading interest rates, commodities, and their derivatives to help companies manage risks).

For example, if General Store Co. sold stock with a bank, whoever first bought shares would possibly have a hard time selling them to other individuals if people are not familiar with the company. The investment bank agrees to buy the shares sold and look for a buyer. This provides liquidity to the markets. The bank normally does not care about the fundamental, intrinsic value of the shares, but only that it can sell them at a slightly higher price than it could buy them. To do this, an investment bank employs traders. Over time these traders began to devise different strategies within this system to earn even more profit independent of providing client liquidity, and this is how proprietary trading was born.

The evolution of proprietary trading at banks has come to the point whereby banks employ multiple desks of traders devoted solely to proprietary trading with the hopes of earning added profits above that of market-making trading. These desks are often considered internal hedge funds within the bank, performing in isolation away from client-flow traders. Proprietary desks routinely have the highest value at risk among other desks at the bank. Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and the late Merrill Lynch are known to earn a significant portion of their quarterly and annual profits through proprietary trading efforts.^{[citation needed]}

The proprietary trading desk is kept separate, by law, from knowledge about customer flow, so they cannot engage in the business of front-running a customer’s order.

There often exists confusion between proprietary positions held by market-making desks (sometimes referred to as warehoused risk) and desks specifically assigned the task of proprietary trading.

Because of the impending financial regulation (Volcker Rule in particular), major banks have spun off their prop trading desks or shut them down all together. However, prop trading is not gone. It is carried out at specialized prop trading firms and hedge funds. Some of the notable prop trading firms are based in Chicago, including GETCO LLC, Optiver, Jump Trading LLC and DRW Trading Group. The prop trading done at these prop trading firms is usually highly technology driven, utilizing complex quantitative models and algorithms.

Arbitrage

One of the main strategies of trading, traditionally associated with banks, is arbitrage. In the most basic sense, arbitrage is defined as taking advantage of a price discrepancy through the purchase/sale of certain combinations of securities to lock in a profit.

Many people confuse arbitrage with what is essentially a normal investment. The difference between arbitrage and a typical investment is the amount of reward: the risk in what is known as arbitrage today (to distinguish it from theoretical arbitrage, which effectively does not exist) is market neutral. From the second the trade is executed, a profit is locked in. Investment banks, which are often active in many markets around the world, constantly watch for arbitrage opportunities.

One of the more notable areas of arbitrage, called risk arbitrage, evolved in the 1980s. When a company plans to buy another company, often the price of a share in the capital of the buyer falls (because the buyer will have to pay money to buy the other company) and the price of a share in the capital of the purchased company rises (because the buyer usually buys those shares at a price higher than the current price). When an investment bank believes a buyout is imminent, it often sells short the shares of the buyer (betting that the price will go down) and buys the shares of the company being acquired (betting the price will go up).

Conflicts of interest in proprietary trading

There are a number of ways in which proprietary trading can create conflicts of interest between a trader’s interests and those of its customers.^[1]

As investment banks are key figures in mergers and acquisitions, it is possible (though prohibited) for traders to use inside information to engage in merger arbitrage. Investment banks are required to have a Chinese wall separating their trading and investment banking divisions; however, in recent years, dating most recently back to the Enron scandal, these have come under great scrutiny.

One example of an alleged conflict of interest can be found in charges brought by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission against Citigroup in 2007.^[2]

Famous trading banks and traders

Famous proprietary traders have included Steven A. Cohen, Edward Lampert, Daniel Och, and Boaz Weinstein. Some of the investment banks most historically associated with trading was Salomon Brothers and Drexel Burnham Lambert, and currently Goldman Sachs. Nick Leeson took down Barings Bank with unauthorized proprietary positions. Another trader, Brian Hunter, brought down the hedge fund Amaranth Advisors when his massive positions in natural gas futures went bad.

References

1. 1. “Conflict of Interest Lessons From Financial Services”. 2005-02-22. Retrieved 2009-01-13.
2. 2. “Citigroup challenges Australian commission’s conflict of interest ruling”.

links

• http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3004344?f=related
• http://www.trading-lab.com/forums/introduction_proprietary_trading-t305.html
• http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/44f593ee-06a7-11df-b426-00144feabdc0.html
• [1] Proprietary trading: truth and fiction

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS MAY 23 2012: RENMINBI

Central bankers’ speeches for 23 May now available‏

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Wed 5/23/12

Central bankers’ speeches for 23 May 2012
now available on the BIS website

José Manuel González-Páramo: Completing the euro project – the day after tomorrow

Sayuri Shirai: Recent global economic developments and monetary policy in Japan – strengthening Japan’s growth momentum through opportunities in emerging Asia

Eddie Yue: Renminbi – a new era and the role of Hong Kong

All speeches from 1997 onwards are available from the BIS website at:

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm.

Communications

Bank for International Settlements

E-mail: press@bis.org

Website: www.bis.org

Phone: +41 61 280 8188

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Central bankers’ speeches for 23 May now available‏

http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm

Press, Service (press@bis.org)

Wed 5/23/12